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I. INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property law serves a variety of societal goals, including
fostering innovation and promoting economic and cultural development.
While vital, however, intellectual property law alone cannot optimally achieve
these widely shared goals. An important issue deserving scholarly attention
concerns the proper role of the federal tax system in achieving intellectual
property law's innovation objectives. Most tax theorists would argue that an
ideal tax system should seek to minimize the social costs of taxation and avoid
unnecessarily shaping economic behavior. But it might be decided that the tax
system should depart from these tax principles to further innovation. Of
course, tax rules that deliberately attempt to reward creative process and
further innovation must provide certainty, clarity, and dependability necessary
for compliance with, and sound administration of, the law. To do that, the
rules must necessarily recognize changes in innovation and reflect the realities
oftoday's economy.
The Income Tax of 1913, which was adopted shortly after the ratification of
1
the Sixteenth Amendment, encompassed only fourteen pages of statutes. It
did not specifically address intellectual property and scant administrative

1. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 116-80. The first income tax was not enacted
untill862. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (repealed 1872); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
TilE
TREASURY,
Fact Sheet on the History of the US
Tax System,
http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/ ustax.shtml O.ast visited October 22, 2010).
The income tax was reinstated in 1894. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 570. But, it was
shortly thereafter declared unconstitutional as a direct tax not apportioned among the states.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loar1 & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). This led to the adoption ofthe
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which allows Congress to levy a direct tax without
apportionment. U.S. CoNST. amend. XVI. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H.
SCHENK, fEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 6-7 (6th ed. 2009); I.
RICHARD GERSHON & JEFFREY A. MAINE, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO TilE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE 1-2 (5th ed. 2007).
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guidance existed on the application of traditional tax principles to intellectual
property transactions. This was of no particular consequence at a time when
tangible, physical property was the driving engine of commerce.
As intellectual property's role in the world economy increased so, too, did
the controversies between taxpayers and the government over the tax
implications of intellectual property transactions (e.g., development,
acquisitions, sales, and licenses). Equipped only with general tax rules, which
had theretofore been applied only to tangible assets, courts were increasingly
faced with important, new questions. For example, should research and
development costs be currently deductible under general tax principles even
though the research may not result in the development of a patent or other
identifiable asset? Should a copyright assignment be treated as a "sale" under
general tax principles, even though payment is in the form of royalties?
Should litigation costs in patent infringement suits be treated the same for tax
purposes as litigation costs in trademark infringement suits? There was
considerable diversity of opinion among the courts dealing with these and
other significant tax issues involving intellectual property. Sound federal tax
legislation was necessary to improve the clarity and consistency of tax results.
Congress did not begin enacting specific intellectual property tax rules until
the mid-twentieth century, even though intellectual property laws relating to
protection and enforcement had been developing since the inception of the
nation. As a result of tax legislation over the past six decades, the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) contains several specific rules governing major
transactions involving various forms of intellectual property. Some of the
present rules are exclusive, governing specific forms of intellectual property;
others are equally applicable to all forms of intellectual property. While some
of the rules were designed to support intellectual property goals (i.e., to
incentivize desirable intellectual property activity and promote economic
growth), the vast majority of the specific tax rules were enacted on an ad hoc
basis with particular tax goals in mind. This Article traces the historic
development of the specific tax rules governing intellectual property, identifies
present areas of policy dissonance in the intersection of intellectual property
and taxation, and calls for an appropriate legal framework for future
intellectual property tax legislation.
Part II of the Article describes how early courts struggled to understand the
unique attributes of intellectual property and their relevance under general tax
principles in resolving intellectual property disputes. Because some of the
earliest disputes involved the taxation of patent transactions, Part II provides
several examples of early tax uncertainties in the life cycle of a patent.
Part III identifies underlying causes of early procedural dissonance between
intellectual property and taxation that resulted when traditional principles of
taxation applicable to tangible property were applied to intellectual property
transactions. Specifically, Part III argues that this procedural dissonance
resulted primarily from three sources: (1) difficulty identifying when intangible
intellectual property rights constituted separable property for tax purposes
when competing concepts of property could yield differing tax results; (2)
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difficulty reconciling the substantive similarities and differences among the
forms of intellectual property in determining proper tax results and developing
frameworks for future guidance; and (3) difficulty establishing, for tax
purposes, the relevance of tangible media embodying intellectual property vis
a-vis the intangible legal attributes of intellectual property. Part III highlights
the need for a rational set of special tax rules to resolve uncertainties and
difficulties that arose upon the early intersection of intellectual property and
taxation.
Part IV of the Article examines legislative responses to early dissonance
between the intellectual property regime and historic tax principles. In
analyzing intellectual property tax rules, it is helpful to understand as much as
possible about why they exist and how they fit into or conflict with the
intellectual property scheme. To that end, Part IV analyzes tax rules specific to
intellectual property in terms of their legislative purpose and seeks to identifY
common goals behind special intellectual property tax rules. Part V observes
that, although a few tax provisions were designed to achieve important
intellectual property goals, the vast majority were designed with specific tax
goals in mind: to remove tax inequities or to enhance administrative efficiency.
The addition of specific tax rules governing intellectual property achieved
necessary procedural harmonization between the intellectual property and
taxation schemes. Part V, however, shows that the resulting tax regime may
not be adequately relevant in reflecting the evolution of technology and the
reality of today's economy, such as the current integration and bundling of
different types of intellectual property in practice. These, and perhaps other,
areas of existing dissonance in the intersection of intellectual property and
taxation need to be addressed if the tax system is to foster the intellectual
2
property system's innovation objectives.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: APPLYING NORMATIVE TAX
PRINCIPLES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The term "intellectual property" was first mentioned in Davoli v. Brown, a
3
Massachusetts case decided in 1845.
The term "intellectual property"

2. This Article traces the development of specific tax rules governing intellectual property
and notes the need for harmonization between the intellectual property and taxation schemes. For
a critique ofthe broader intellectual property tax regime (which includes a combination of special
and general tax rules) using normative criteria in evaluating taxes (equity and efficiency) and for
a proposed legal framework for future tax legislation, see Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A.
Maine, Equity andEfficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BRooK. L. REv. 1 (2010).
3. Davoli v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) ("A liberal construction is to
be given to a patent, and inventors sustained, if practicable, without a departure from sound
principles. Only thus can ingenuity and perseverance be encouraged to exert themselves in this
way usefully to the community; and only in this way can we protect intellectual property, the
labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man's own, and as much the fruit of his
honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears."); see also Peter S. Merrell,
Intellectual Property am the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 37,
available at http ://www.cato.org/pubs!regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-6.pdf (citing Davoll v. Brown
as the first reported legal decision using the term "intellectual property").
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generally refers to patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Though
the term "intellectual property" came into existence in the nineteenth century,
different types of intellectual property have been in existence for a much
5
6
longer time. Some have been around for several hundred years and others
7
for several thousand years.
Early federal income tax laws did not deal specifically with intellectual
8
property assets even though protections for these rights had long existed. At
the beginning of our nation, Congress had the enumerated power to lay and
9
Early on Congress levied numerous tariffs on items such as
collect tax.
distilled SJ?irits, tobacco and snuff, auction sales, and various legal
10
documents.
The first income tax, however, was not enacted until 1862, to
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009).
5. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese
Trademark Law, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 70-71 (2008) (explaining the
historical fonndation of Chinese trademarks in antiquity); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding
Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REv. 1155, 1159 n.lO (2005) (noting the development of
trademarks as source identifiers).
6. See generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
LAw 43-44 (1967) (stating that nnder the Venetian Patent Statute, the Venetian government
granted a privilegi to Marc' Antonio Sabellico on September 1, 1486, for his work of authorship,
Decades rerum Cenetarum); Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1915)
(observing the growing body oflaw relating to copyrights in the eighteenth century).
7. See Milton E. Babirak, Jr., The Maryland Unifonn Trade Secrets Act: A Critical
Summary of the Act and Case Law, 31 U. BALT. L. REv. 181, 183 (2002) (noting the history of
trademark law in ancient Rome and Greece); Ke Shao, Look at My Sign!-Trademarks in China
from Antiquity to the Early Modem Times, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 654, 654
(2005) (tracing the history oftrademark usage in China for several thousand years); Alan Watson,
Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TuL. EuR. & Crv. L.F. 19, 19 (1996)
(disputing the accuracy of assertions relating to Roman trade secrets law).
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
9. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, ... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be nniform
throughout the United States."); Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax
Legislation: A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 79-81 (2006) (analyzing
Congress's taxing power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and the requirement for
See generally Yoseph Edrey,
nniform federal tax law throughout the United States).
Constitutional Review and Tax Law: An Analytical Framework, 56 AM. U . L. REv. 1187, 1191
(2007) (explaining that the power of Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to levy
taxes is broad); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source ofthe
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REv. 801, 835-3 7 (2007)
(discussing Congress's power to tax and the Framers' original intent).
Interestingly, the same Section of Article I also vests in Congress the power to grant
copyright and patent rights to authors and inventors. See, e.g., Irah Donner, The Copyright
Clause ofthe US. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include it with Unanimous Approval?, 36
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 361 (1992); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress,
2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1143-60; Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, The "First-to-File " Patent
System: Why Adoption is Not an Option!, 14 Ric H. J.L. & TECH. 3, 17-23 (2007) (tracing the
roots of the Patent and Copyright Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution); Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress ofScience and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin
ofthe Intellec tual Property Clause ofthe United States Constitution, 2 1. INTELL. PRoP. L. 1, 10
(1994).
10. For a brief history of taxation in the United States, see GRAETZ & ScHENK, supra note 1,
at 4-12. The Department of Treasury's website also provides a brief history of the U.S. tax
system:
To pay the debts of the Revolutionary War, Congress levied excise taxes on
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help finance the Civil War, and it was re~ealed after the war in 1872 due to the
1
The income tax was reinstated in
decline in the need for federal revenue.
1894 but was declared unconstitutional shortly thereafter as a direct tax not
12
apportioned among the states.
This led to the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913, which allows Congress to levy a direct tax without
13
apportionment.
The Income Tax of 1913 was adopted shortly after the
14
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.
These early income tax laws were void of tax rules specific to intellectual
15
property.
This was of no particular consequence at a time when tangible,
physical property was the driving engine of modern commerce. As intellectual
property became the dominant source of wealth in the world, however, the tax
implications of intellectual property transactions became more important.
Courts were called upon to resolve numerous controversies between taxpay ers
and the government over the tax consequences of intellectual property
development, acquisitions, and dispositions. Because the existing tax regime
did not specifically address these matters, courts were forced to rely upon
general tax principles in resolving tax disputes. Outcomes were diverse as
courts struggled to understand the unique, intangible characteristics of
intellectual property and to determine their relevance under general tax rules
applicable to tangible property.
Some of the earliest tax debates involved patent transactions. To frame
some of the issues with which courts struggled, the following example is
provided. It highlights tax uncertainties in the life cycle of a patent
development, acquisition, and disposition. As is demonstrated, the intangible
nature of patent rights challenged many early notions of tax law.

distilled spirits, tobacco and snuff, refined sugar, carriages, property sold at
auctions, and various legal documents.
During the confrontation with France in the late 1790's, the Federal
Government imposed the first direct taxes on the owners of houses, land,
slaves, and estates.
When the Civil War erupted, the Congress passed
the Revenue Act of 1861, which restored earlier excises taxes and imposed a
tax on personal incomes.
On July 1, 1862 the Congress passed new excise taxes on such items as
playing cards, gunpowder, feathers , telegrams, iron, leather, pianos, yachts,
billiard tables, drugs, patent medicines, and whiskey.
Many legal
documents were also taxed and license fees were collected for almost all
professions and trades. . . . The need for Federal revenue declined sharply
after the war and most taxes were repealed. By 1868, the main somce of
Government revenue derived from liquor and tobacco taxes. The income tax
was abolished in 1872. From 1868 to 1913, almost 90 percent of all revenue
was collected from the remaining excises.
U.S. DEP'T OF TilE TREASURY, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever somce derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.").
14. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-80.
15. There has been a tremendous amount of tax legislation since 1913. It was not unti11950,
however, that Congress enacted a tax provision specific to intellectual property. See infra Part V.
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A. APPLYING GENERAL ASSET CAPITALIZATION TO RESEARCH COSTS

Since inception of the modem federal income tax, the Code has permitted a
16
The Code
current deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses.
has precluded, however, a current deduction for so-called "capital
expenditures," historically viewed as any expenditure that produces an asset
17
Applying the asset capitalization rule
lasting beyond the current tax period.
to tangible property presents few problems. If a business spends money to
construct a widget-making machine, a classic capital asset (i.e., a separate and
distinct asset lasting beyond the construction year), the construction costs are
18
In contrast, applying the asset capitalization rule to
not currently deductible.
research and development costs can be challenging for a number of reasons. It
is often difficult to determine when research activities result in an identifiable
asset, the costs of which must be capitalized. Further, because research may
span several years with varying degrees of success, it is often difficult to
apportion costs if a particular project partly succeeds and partly fails or when
different and simultaneous research activities contribute in varying degrees to
19
the development of an asset or assets.
Perhaps it was for these reasons that the Treasury adopted a liberal approach
in its initial treatment of research costs. In 1919, it promulgated a regulation
that gave taxpayers the option of either deducting or capitalizing expenses "for
designs, drawings, patterns, models, or work of an experimental nature [if]
calculated to result in improvement[s] of [taxpayers'] facilities or [taxpayers']
20
Shortly thereafter, however, the Treasury deleted the
product[ s]. "
21
regulation because it found that certain taxpayers were enjoying double tax
16. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 ("(I]n computing net income for
the purpose ofthe normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses
actually paid in carrying on any business ...."). For the current business expense allowance
provision, see I.R.C. § 162 (2010).
17. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (providing "(t]hat no deduction
shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements, or
betterments, made to increase the value of any property'). For the current disallowance
provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (2010). The reason capital expenditures are not currently
deductible is that the property created or acquired is not consumed or used up within the year but
rather continues to contribute to income over a period of years. If the costs incurred in the
creation or acquisition of such property were deductible in full in the current year, there would be
a mismatching of income and expenses that produced that income; income would be understated
in the year of creation or acquisition and overstated in later years. By prohibiting the immediate
deduction of capital expenditures, this problem is avoided.
18. See I.R.C. §§ 263(a), 263A(a) (2010); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2, 73 Fed. Reg.
12838, 12852-56 (Mar. 10, 2008) (providing rules for applying section 263 to amounts paid to
produce tangible property).
19. See DavidS. Hudson, The Tax Concept ofResearch or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW.
85, 88--89 (1991) (explaining why the asset-capitalization rule is difficult to apply to research and
development costs); see also George Mundstock, Taxation ofBusiness Intangible Capital, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1179, 1258- 59 (1987).
20. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) (Regulation 45 states: "A
taxpayer who has incurred expenses in his business for designs, drawings, patterns, models, or
work of an experimental nature calculated to result in improvement of his facilities or his product,
may at his option deduct such expenses from gross income for the taxable year in which they are
incurred or treat such articles as a capital asset to the extent ofthe amount so expended.").
21. Treas. Reg. 69, art. 168 (1926).
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benefits from their research-i.e., deducting research expenses when paid, but
also capitalizin~ them in the basis of developed patents thereby reducing gain
2
on later sales.
Even though the Treasury eliminated the deduction option,
the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) continued to allow certain taxpayers
to deduct research expenditures-namely those taxpayers who engaged in
regular and continual research activities and who had established practices of
23
accounting for research costs.
Courts did not necessarily find the Service's
24
Indeed, if the Service challenged the
administrative policy binding.
deduction of research costs incurred in the development of new processes,
formulae, or patents, courts generally adhered to the asset-capitalization
. . 1 25
pnnc1p e.
But without a framework for resolving tax disputes, courts struggled to
apply the asset-capitalization rule to research costs. Should capitalization
depend on the taxpayer's subjective intent or purpose of research activities, or
should capitalization depend on the success of research activities? In other
words, should capitalization be required if the taxpayer intends to improve an
existing product or develop a new process or patent, or should capitalization be
required only if the taxpayer develops a capital asset having a useful life
beyond the year?
Moreover, should a distinction be drawn between
expenditures incurred for general scientific research and expenditures to
develop patents on a particular process or formula? And when should
capitalization apply to payments for technical assistance and know-how of
services? There was lack of uniformity in addressing these and other
.
.
26
1mportant questwns.
22. The Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the Tax Court), in at least two cases,
sanctioned the double tax benefit. See Gilliam Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 967, 970 (1925);
Goodell-Pratt Co. v. Comm'r, 3 B.T.A. 30, 33-34 (1925). In these cases, the government argued
capitalization was not appropriate since the taxpayer had elected earlier to deduct research costs.
The court fonnd, however, that capitalization was proper since research costs resulted in creation
of a patent. Gilliam Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. at 970; Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 B.T.A. at 32. For the early
treatment of research expenses, see generally Donald C. Alexander, Research am Experimental
Expenditures Umer the 1954 Code, 10 TAX L. REv. 549 (1955); James L. Musselman, Research

and Experimental Expenditures-The Evolution of Deductibility Under the Trade or Business
Requirement ofSection 174 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 42 RuTGERS L. REv. 757 (1990).
23. See Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 321, 341-42 (1955) (quoting
statement by former Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Dunlap).
24. !d. at 343.
25. See, e.g. , Oaude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Corum 'r, 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); Hazeltine Corp. v.
Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 110 (1935), affd, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937); Clem v. Comm'r, 10 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1248 (1951).
26. In Strong, for example, the taxpayer spent sums to perfect a machine, but did not
improve the machine or develop anything that was of subsequent use to him. Strong v. Corum 'r,
14 B.T.A. 902, 903 (1928). The Board of Tax Appeals held that the research costs were
deductible because the amounts did not result in the acquisition, development, or improvement of
a capital asset having a useful life beyond the year; the taxpayer was engaged in purely
experimental work in the development of this machine. Id at 903-04. On similar facts, a
different court required capitalization of research costs. Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co. v.
Corum 'r, 182 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1950). In Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., the taxpayer
spent money to develop a new product from agricultural material using biological processes;
however nothing of commercial value or of patentable nature was developed, so the biological
research was dropped. Id at 154-55. The court held that the research expenditures were not
currently deductible since they were calculated to result in improvement of its facilities or its
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Requiring capitalization of research expenditures seemed somewhat harsh,
especially if research efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. In such cases, tax
law did permit an abandonment loss deduction for the year in which
27
But a loss deduction upon subsequent failure of
abandonment occurred.
research efforts was hardly viewed as an adequate economic incentive for
28
This highlights a
taxpayers to engage in desirable research activities.
fundamental problem with the general asset-capitalization rule: not only was it
highly difficult to apply to research and development, but more significant£;, it
also served to actually discourage important research and experimentation.
B. APPLYING HISTORIC DEPRECIATION RULES TO PATENT ACQUISITION COSTS
In an economic sense, depreciation is the decline in value of an asset due to
3
From the tax perspective, depreciation is a
wear and tear and obsolescence.
deduction from income, permitting the taxpayer to recover the capitalized cost
31
of that asset.
Depreciation methods are sometimes called cost recovery
32
systems.
So, for example, if an asset used in business for five years cost a
taxpayer $20,000, the taxpayer might take a $4,000 deduction each year on her
taxes for five years to reflect the decline in value of that asset and to reflect its
contribution to the production of taxable income. The entire cost of the asset is
not deducted all at once because the asset helped produce income over five
33
To match the taxpayer's expenses against the revenues they helped
years
produce, the taxpayer must spread out the deduction over the useful life of the
34
This is, of course, a basic application of the principle discussed
asset.
above-that the costs of assets must be capitalized.
An early Treasury regulation adopted a seemingly simple rule for the

°

products: "[W]e cannot conclude that it was not within the contemplation [of the taxpayer] that
research ... might develop something of a commercial and permanent value to petitioner." !d. at
156.
27. !d. at 157 (''Where there has been a complete abandonment of experiments and failure
becomes an actual fact, a loss may be taken by way of deduction ... .");see Dresser Mfg. Co. v.
Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 341, 345-46 (1939); Acme Prod Co. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 194, 196 (1931);
see also Clem, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1248 (disallowing an abandonment deduction as taxpayer was
still engaged in developing and perfecting his machine).
28. Taxpayers will nearly always be economically advantaged by the acceleration of tax
deductions. Current deductions reduce the taxpayer's current tax liability thereby leaving the
taxpayer with the use of his or her money for longer. Because money makes money, the use of
money has value. This is commonly referred to as ''the time value of money." See generally
PAMELA PETERSON DRAKE & fRANK J. FABOZZl, FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF TilE
T1ME VALUE OF MoNEY (2009).
29. Internal Revenue Code of1954: Hearing on H.R. 8300 Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1954).
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (9th ed. 2009).
31. JAMES J. fREELAND ET AL., FuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 407 (5th
ed. 2009).
32. !d. at 408--{)9.
33. See id. at 407-08.
34. At the end of the asset's useful life, the acquisition costs will have been fully recovered,
and the asset's basis will be zero, reflecting that all capitalized costs have been recovered fully.
See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (2010) (providing that the asset's basis is reduced each year as
depreciation deductions are taken with respect to the asset).
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depreciation of intangible assets. If an acquired intangible asset could be
shown to have a limited useful life, then the capitalized acquisition costs were
35
recoverable (deductible) over that asset's lifetime
As a corollary, the
capitalized cost of an intangible asset that had no definite useful life was not
recoverable through depreciation but could only be recovered upon
36
abandonment or disposition of the asset.
Under this legal framework,
patents and copyrights were eligible for depreciation due to the fact that they
have limited useful lives (statutory legal lives of 20 years in the case of patents,
37
and 70, 95, or 120 years in the case of certain copyrights).
In contrast, other
traditional intellectual property rights (trade secrets, trademarks, trade namesJ
3
were not eligible for depreciation because they do not have limited lives.
The same was true for goodwill; the costs of acquiring goodwill were not
eligible for amortization allowances, as goodwill does not have an
39
These early depreciation rules for recovering the
ascertainable limited life.
capitalized costs of intangibles created several problems.
One problem with the historic depreciation rule for intangibles was that it
caused much litigation concerning the identification and valuation of intangible
40
No deduction for depreciation was allowable with respect to
assets.
goodwill, so taxpayers tried to distinguish intan¥ible assets from goodwill; the
4
Service often challenged those determinations.
The touching point was that
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960) ("If an intangible asset is known from experience or
other factors to be of use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period,
the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be
the subject of a depreciation allowance.").
36. Id. ("An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the
allowance for depreciation.").
37. A patent confers the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for
sale, or importing the claimed invention for a certain term of years (currently twenty years from
the date of application). 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), (d) (2001). Ownership of a valid copyright
confers five exclusive rights for a limited time. Id. The Copyright Act, over the years, has
lengthened the term of copyright protection. Currently, a work of authorship enjoys a term of the
life of the author and seventy years thereafter. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005). For works created
under the doctrine of"works made for hire," the term is ninety-five years after first publication or
120 years after creation. Id. § 302(c).
38. There is no specific term of protection for trade secrets; the protection is available as
long as confidential proprietary information is kept in secrecy, which could be indefinite. See
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§ 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-38 (1990). Likewise, there is no
specific term of protection for trademarks and trade names; the protection is available as long as
the trademark or trade name is used in commerce and has not been abandoned. See 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (2009) (providing presumption of abandonment if nonuse of a trademark extends for three
years).
39. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right,
56 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 14 n. 75 (2004) ("The prohibition against amortizing the cost of goodwill
first appeared in Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-3, which stated that '[n)o deduction for depreciation is
allowable with respect to goodwill.' This prohibition first appeared in the regulations in 1927.
See Kevin R. Conzelrnann, 533-2d T.M., Amortization ofIntangibles, A-5 & n.32 (2001) (citing
T.D. 4055, VI-2 C. B. 63; Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 163 (Revenue Act ofl926)).
40. See Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization ofIntangible Assets: § 197 ofthe Internal
Revenue Code Settles the ConfUsion, 27 CONN. L. REv. 915, 918 (1955) ("Because the
determination of whether an intangible can be amortized was a question of fact, the outcome of
such litigation varied widely according to the circumstances of each particular case.").
41. Id. ("Additional confusion and litigation arose because the term 'goodwill' is not defined
in the Code or in the regulations.').
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goodwill was viewed by the government as an umbrella covering all intangible
assets of a business. This historical concept of goodwill led to considerable
controversy between taxpayers and the Service. While taxpayers attempted to
argue that a wide variety of intangible assets were independent assets severable
from goodwill (and eligible for depreciation provided they had a limited useful
life), the Service strongly held to the position that these intangible assets were
indistinguishable or inseparable from goodwill (and not eligible for
42
Clear guidance was needed for taxpayers who, for example,
depreciation).
purchased patents along with certain associated trademarks and other
intangibles.
Even if patents and other intangible assets were capable of being separately
identified and valued, controversies existed over the appropriate cost recovery
methods and recovery periods for such assets. A common method for
depreciating patent costs was the so-called "straight-line method," under which
capitalized acquisition costs are deducted ratably over the asset's estimated
43
Application of this seemingly simple method raised a number of
useful life.
questions. For example, was the useful life of a patent the statutory legal life
of the patent, or instead, the period over which the patent was reasonably
expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his or her business or in the production
of income? If the latter approach was appropriate, should the taxpayer
establish useful life based upon some general industry standard, or should the
taxpayer establish useful life of a patent based upon his or her own experiences
with similar property? If useful life was based on taxpayer experiences, what
was the appropriate standard in forecasting the asset's useful life? In 1969, the
Service authorized a five-year amortization period for software acquisition
44
costs rendering these questions moot for software
The usefulness of some patents is not adequately measurable by the passage
of time alone but is more accurately measurable by the income the patent
produces. As a result of distortions caused by the straight-line method, the
Service eventually permitted patents to be depreciated under the so-called
"income forecast method," under which costs are recovered as income is
45
earned from exploitation of the patent.
The depreciation allowance in any
given year is computed by multiplying the original capitalized acquisition cost
of the patent by a fraction, the numerator of which is income from the patent
for the taxable year, and the denominator of which is the forecasted or
estimated total income to be earned in connection with the patent during its

42. The controversy over whe1her to characterize intangible assets as goodwill was
eventually settled wi1h 1he Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States. 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993). The Supreme Court held 1hat amortization of an intangible
asset depends on whe1her 1he asset is capable ofbeing valued and whe1her the asset has a limited
useful life. !d. The Court r~ected 1he Service's argument that a taxpayer must also prove 1hat 1he
intangible is separate and distinct from goodwill. !d.
43. Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(b)-1 (1960).
44. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, superseded by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-1 C.B. 601.
45. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, amplified by Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62,
amplifiedby Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C. B. 91.
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46

useful life.
While the income forecast method is perhaps more accurate in
reflecting income than the straight-line method, its application is complex. It
is often difficult to determine yearly and forecasted income for purposes of the
above formula; revised computations are required if estimates are substantially
overstated or underestimated as a result of circumstances that arise in later
47
years, and a complex set of "look back" rules may require a taxpayer to pay
interest to the government if deductions were accelerated due to
.
. o f expected.mcome. 48
undereshmatwn
Another problem with the historical depreciation scheme stemmed from the
fact that the rules for depreciating intangible intellectual property assets
differed dramatically from the corresponding set of rules for depreciating
tangible assets. Over time, Congress enacted a detailed set of arbitrary
depreciation rules for all tangible assets. These Code provisions provided
arbitrary conventions and methods for depreciating costs of tangible assets and,
more importantly, provided artificially low recovery periods (e.g., three, five,
and seven years) for many tangible assets that arguably have longer useful
49
This disparate treatment between intellectual property assets and
lives.
5
tangible assets created distortions that were unfair to taxpayers. For example,
taxpayers who acquired businesses with mostly tangible assets fared better
than taxpayers who acquired businesses with mostly intellectual property
assets, a problem that worsened as more and more valuable business assets
51
took the form of intellectual property assets.
Seeking to mitigate these
distortions, many saw the need to reconcile the treatment of acquired
52
intangible assets with the treatment of acquired tangible assets.

°

C. APPLYING GENERAL SALE PRINCIPLES TO PATENT DISPOSITIONS

A transfer of property for consideration is treated for tax purposes as either a
sale or a license-with significant tax differences depending on how the
transfer is characterized. If a property transfer is considered a sale for tax
purposes, then the transferor is permitted to recover tax-free any remaining
46. The following simple example illustrates the computation: In Year 1, Taxpayer
purchases a patent for $100 and estimates that forecasted total income from the patent will be
$200. In Year 1, the patent generates income of$80. The depreciation allowance for Year 1 is
$40, computed by multiplying the capitalized acquisition cost of $100 by the fraction obtained by
dividing current year income of $80 by forecasted total income of $200. Under this approach,
40% of forecasted income was earned in Year 1, so 40% of the total purchase cost was deducted
in Year 1. SeeTreas. Reg.§ 1.167(n)-4(e), Ex. 1.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(b).
48. !d. § l.l67(n)-6.
49. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2010) (providing a set of arbitrary rules for determining the
appropriate depreciation allowance for all forms oftangible property, both personal and real).
50. See Allen Walburn, Depreciation ofIntangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need of
Change, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453, 454-56 (1993) (explaining that the inequity between
similarly situated taxpayers resulted in noncompliance and much litigation, which unnecessarily
burdened the administration oftax law).
51. See Conzelrnann, supra note 39, at A-3 & n. 7 (citing Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States and noting that taxpayers with resources "had a much better success rate in
litigation than poorer taxpayers").
52. !d.
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53

and the resulting gain may be taxed at
basis in the property transferred,
preferential capital gain rates rather than the much higher ordinary income
54
If, however, the transfer is characterized as a license for tax purposes,
rates.
the transferor is not permitted to recover any basis in the property, and the full
amounts received must be reported and taxed as ordinary income rather than
capital gain. Characterizing a transfer of tangible property as either a sale or
license for tax purposes is relatively straightforward in most cases. If a
property owner has fee simple title to a piece of land (i.e., owns the whole
"bundle of sticks" or "attributes of ownership") and transfers title in fee simple
to a buyer for consideration, a "sale" has occurred. Characterizing the transfer
of intangible intellectual property rights under general tax principles is not as
easy.
Determining whether a patent transfer was a sale or license under general
tax principles was the subject of many early court decisions. In contrast to
most land transactions, wherein sellers transfer all attributes of ownership for a
lump sum, patent transfers typically include numerous limitations and
restrictions and often involve contingent payments resembling royalties. And
so numerous courts were called upon to tackle hard questions: What are the
substantial attributes of patent ownership? Must the entire bundle of rights
(sticks) be given away for sale treatment, or may certain rights be retained?
Should the existence of contingent payments preclude sale treatment even if all
ownership rights were transferred?
In establishing the basic criteria of a sale under general tax rules, courts held
that a patent owner must transfer the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the
55
An
patented article; anything short of that was not a sale but a license.
53. I.R.C. § lOOl(a) (2010) (providing 1he amonnt of gain on 1he sale ofproperty is equal to
1he excess of the amonnt realized in the transaction over the amonnt of the taxpayer's adjusted
basis in 1he property sold).
54. Individual taxpayers generally prefer gains to be classified as capital gains ra1her than
ordinary income because certain capital gains are afforded preferential tax treatment. Presently,
the maximum rate at which most long-term capital gains are taxed is 15%, whereas the highest
rate at which other types of income (ordinary income and short-term capital gains) are taxed is
35o/o-a significant mte differential for high earners. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(d), (i)(l)-{2). Under
general tax principles, preferential capital gain treatment requires a "sale or exchange" of a
"capital asset." I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (2010). See JoHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MArnE, THE
FuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 219 (2d ed. 2010) (giving several policy reasons for the
tax rate preference accorded to capital gains).
55. A large number of tax cases followed Waterman, one of the leading authorities dealing
wi1h the transfer of patents. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U .S. 252 (1891). In 1hat case, 1he
Supreme Court said:
Whe1her a transfer of a particular right or interest nnder a patent is an
assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by which it calls
itself, but upon 1he legal effect of its provisions. For instance, a grant of an
exclusive right to make, use, and vend two patented machines within a
certain district is an assignment, and gives the grantee the right to sue in his
own name for an infringement within 1he district, because the right, although
limited to making, using, and vending two machines, excludes all other
persons, even the patentee, from making, using, or vending like machines
within 1he district. On the other hand, the grant of an exclusive right nnder
the patent within a certain district, which does not include the right to make,
and 1he right to use, and the right to sell, is not a grant of a title in 1he whole
patent-right within the district, and is therefore only a license. Such, for
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"exclusive license" to manufacture, use, and sell for the life of a patent would
be considered a sale because, in substantive effect, all right, title, and interest
in the property was transferred irrespective of the location ofl~al title or other
5
In contrast, a
formalities of language contained in the license agreement.
"nonexclusive license"~a transfer that granted the transferee only segregated
57
or limited rights~would be considered a license rather than a sale.
For
58
example, transfers with duration limitations,
transfers that divided the
59
manufacturing of patents between the transferor and transferee, and transfers
60
that granted the right to make and sell but not the right to "use"
were
generally treated as licenses rather than sales for tax purposes.
Under this broad framework, much litigation centered on determining what
restrictions or limitations in particular patent agreements precluded a finding of
a sale for tax purposes. Many patent assignments contain geographical
limitations or field-of-use restrictions. Should the grant of an exclusive right to
make, use, and sell a patent to only a certain geographical area be considered a
sale for tax purposes, even though the transferor retained those rights with
61
respect to all other geographical areas ?
Similarly, should the grant of the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell a patent to only a particular industry be
considered a sale for tax purposes even though the transferor retained those

instance, is a grant of '1he full and exclusive right to make and vend' wi1hin
a certain district, reserving to the grantor 1he right to make wi1hin the
district, to be sold outside of it. So is a grant of '1he exclusive right to make
and use, ' but not to sell, patented machines within a certain district. So is an
instrument granting '1he sole right and privilege of manufacturing and
selling' patented articles, and not expressly au1horizing 1heir use, because,
1hough this might carry by implication 1he right to use articles made under
1he patent by 1he licensee, it certainly would not au1horize him to use such
articles made by o1hers.
Id at 255-56 (holding 1hat an agreement by which a patent owner granted "the sole and exclusive
right and license to manufacture and sell" 1he patented article throughout 1he United States was
not an assignment, but a license) (internal citations omitted). Watenne01 involved 1he question of
who were 1he indispensable parties in an infringement suit. As a result, not all courts followed
1he Court's view as to what constitutes a patent assignment for tax purposes. See, e.g, Bloch v.
United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952) ("Different considerations were obviously involved,
and 1he court's statement as to what constitutes an assignment of title to a patent is not necessarily
controlling in 1he field of taxation.').
56. See, e.g., Rollman v. Comm'r, 244 F.2d 634 (41h Cir. 1957); Watson v. United States,
222 F.2d 689 (101h Cir. 1955).
57. Id
58. See, e.g. , Oak Mfg. Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 259, 263 (71h Cir. 1962); Bell
Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1967); PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928, 1018 (1970); Gregg v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 291, 302 (1952), ajj'dper curium,
203 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1953).
59. See, e.g, Am. Chern. Paint v. Smi1h, 131 F. Supp. 734, 739 (D.C. Pa. 1955).
60. See, e.g., Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621, 624 (101h Cir. 1953); Nat'l Bread Wrapping
Mach. Co. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 550,559 (1958); Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co. v. Comm'r, 10
T.C. 974, 991 (1948), aff'dper curium, 177 F.2d 200, 200 (61h Cir. 1949). But see Rollman, 244
F.2d at 641; C.A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 825 (D.C. Colo. 1967);
Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1959).
61. For early cases holding 1hat transfers were sales for tax purposes despite geographical
limitations, see Watson, 222 F.2d at 689; Crook v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 242, 253 (W.D.
Pa. 1955); Marco v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 544, 549 (1955), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3.
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62

Many patent agreements also
rights with respect to all other industries?
contain certain restrictions that serve to protect the transferor, raising
additional questions: Should a patent transfer be deemed a sale for tax
purposes even though the transferor reserves the right to terminate in the event
63
of transferee's insolvency, bankruptcy, or failure to make payments?
Should
a patent transfer be deemed a sale despite a restriction that the transferee
cannot grant a sublicense without the written consent of the transferor, if the
purchase price is paid in installments and the restriction served to protect the
64
Similarly, should the transferor's retention of the right to sue for
parties?
infringement necessarily preclude a finding of a sale if the restriction is viewed
. dev1ce.
. ?65
as a secunty
In addition to struggling with these important questions, the government and
courts also struggled with the impact, if any, that contingent payments should
have on the "license versus sale" determination. In contrast to real property
transactions, which often involve lump sum or installment payments, patent
agreements typically involv e payments measured by the production, sale, or
use by the transferee, or payments payable over a period generally coterminous
with the transferee's use of the patent. And so the question arose: should a
patent assignment be denied sale treatment solely because the purchase price
took the form of contingent payments? Early cases were split on the issue.
Some courts held that the receipt of contingent payments did not prevent a
66
transfer from being considered a sale, while others held that the receipt of
67
contingent payments did preclude sale treatment.
The Service itself
struggled with the issue. In a 1950 administrative pronouncement, the Service
ruled that an assignment of a patent (or the exclusive license to make, use, and
sell a patented article) would nevertheless be treated as a license for tax
purposes (and, hence, payments received by inventors would be taxed as

62. For early cases holding 1hat transfers were sales despite field-of-use restrictions, see
Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Carru1hers, 219
F.2d 21, 24- 25 (91h Cir. 1955); Flanders, 172 F. Supp. at 950; First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v.
United States, 136 F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.C.N.J. 1955); Rouverol v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 186, 194
(1964), nonacq., 1965-2 C.B. 3. But see Am. Chern. Paint Co. v . Smith, 131 F. Supp. 734, 739
(D.C. Pa. 1955).
63. For early cases holding that transfers were sales despite cancellation rights, see Comm 'r
v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1944); First Nat '/ Bank ofPrinceton, 136 F.
Supp. at 824; Myers v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 258, 265-66, acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. But see Blake v.
Comm'r, 615 F.2d 731, 734-35 (61h Cir. 1980), rev 'g 67 T.C. 7 (1976).
64. For early cases holding 1hat transfers were sales despite sublicensing restrictions, see
Rollman, 244 F.2d at 641; Crook, 135 F. Supp. at 253.
65. For early cases holding that transfers were sales despite such retention rights, see
Watson, 222 F.2d at 689; Celanese Cop., 140 F.2d at 341-42; Graham v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 730,
741-43 (1956), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3.
66. See, e.g., Celanese Cop., 140 F.2d 341 - 42; Comm'r v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406, 411
12 (2d Cir. 1942).
67. See, e.g., Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that, al1hough many
substantial rights in 1he patent retained by plaintiff were indications of 1he failure to transfer
absolute ownership, "1he crux of the matter seems to us to be the retention of an interest in the
profitable exploitation of 1he patented articles by receipt of a percentage of the sales price or a
stated amount for each article sold," and 1hat "(w]ithout such an interest there would be less need
to keep the oilier rights retained here").
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ordinary income) where the transferor received interests resembling
68
Five years later, the Service issued another ruling reiterating its
royalties.
69
position.
In 1958, however, the Service revoked its earlier position and ruled
that patent transferors could enjoy "sale" treatment (and, hence, capital gain
treatment) even though consideration received is measured by production, use,
70
or sale of the patented article.
Without specific rules governing patent transfers, courts struggled with the
attributes of patent ownership when examining individual patent agreements in
their factual context. A framework slowly evolved~a framework that clearly
challenged normative notions of what was and what was not a sale for tax
purposes. Indeed, it was possible for a court to conclude that a patent
agreement was a sale for tax purposes, even though the agreement was titled
"License Agreement," the parties therein were designated "Licensor" and
"Licensee," the agreement contained geographical limitations and field-of-use
and other restrictions, and the agreement called for "royalty" payments
7
contingent on the use or exploitation of the patent by the transferee.
In light
of the inherent factual nature of the "sale versus license" distinction, in
general, and the unique characteristics of patent ownership, in particular, there
was a need for a set of predictable tax rules.
III. SOURCES OF EARLY DISSONANCE BETWEEN THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TAXATION REGIMES
A. ACCEPTING INTELLECfUAL PROPERTY As PROPERTY

Different types of intellectual property rights were treated as
property by courts in the late nineteenth century. For example, in
1868, the court in Peabody v. Norfolk recognized that a trade secret
is property. 72 And later the U.S. Supreme Court held that a

68. Mimeogmph 6490, C.B. 1950-1, 9 ("[W]here the owner of a patent enters into an
agreement whereby, in consideration of the assignment of the patent, or the license of the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell a patented article, the assignee or licensee agrees to pay to
the assignor or licensor an amount measured by a fixed percentage of the selling price of the
article so manufactured and sold, or amounts per unit based upon units manufactured or sold, or
any other method measured by production, sale, or use either by assignee or licensee, or amounts
payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent,
such agreement, for income tax purposes, is to be regarded as providing for the payment of
royalties taxable as ordinary income.').
69. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 C.B. 97.
70. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
71. E.g., Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (lOth Cir. 1955).
72. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868) ("If he invents or discovers, and
keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not
indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire
knowledge of it; but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one
who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to
disclose it to third persons.' ) (emphasis added); Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110,
111, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (Sup. Ct. 1894); see also Luckett v. Orange Julep
Co., 196 S.W. 740, 743-44 (Mo. 1917) (citing cases for the established law that a trade secret is
property).
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regulation requiring the disclosure of a trade secret was a taking of
73
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Courts have long
74
recognized patents as property.
Providing property rights in
patents encourages efficient investment and leads to more
75
innovations.
Similarly, early court decisions routinely held that
76
copyrights were property.
Courts relied on authorities dating back
to the Statute of Anne that recognized copyrights as property. 77
Regarding trademarks, courts in early years held that trademarks
were "a distinct property, separate from the article created by the
original producer" and could be transferred together with the
78
associated establishment.
In these early decisions, courts observed
73. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984); Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-47 (lst Cir. 2002) (en bane) (holding that a state regulation requiring
disclosure of the content of cigarettes was a taking of trade secrets); see also E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (holding the nonexclusive
transfer of a trade secret was a sale su~ect to capital gains tax treatment; DVD Copy Control
Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2003) (holding that trade secrets represent a "constitutionally
recognized property interest in [information)"); 1 RoGER M. MILGRlM, MILGRlM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-11 (2000) (stating that "[p)ractically all jurisdictions have recognized that a
trade secret is property" at least in certain senses); Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of
Trade Sec rets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RlcH. L. REv. 313 (1997)
(offering a critical analysis of trade secret histozy).
74. Stuart v. City of Easton, 170 U.S. 383, 392 (1898) ("[W)e find a recital in the patent that
it is conveyed upon a named consideration, and the patent expressly refers to the act of the
assembly as the authority from which the patentees derived the power to take and hold the
property."); Butterworth v. United States ex rei. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 59 (1884) ("The legislation
based on this provision regards the right of property in the inventor as the medium of the public
advantage derived from his invention; so that in every grant of the limited monopoly two interests
are involved: that of the public, who are the grantors, and that of the patentee.'); Wilson v.
Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 674-75 (1846) ("[U)nless the executor or administrator is
permitted to take the place of the patentee in case of his death, and make application for the grant
of the second term, which continues the exclusive enjoyment of the right of property in the
invention, the o~ect of the statute will be defeated, and a valuable right of property, intended to
be secured, lost to his estate."); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 59 1, 658 (1834) ("And yet it
has never been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any property in his
invention, after he shall have sold it publicly.").
75. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002) ("The patent laws 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ' by rewarding
innovation with a temporary monopoly. The monopoly is a property right; and like any property
right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it
enables efficient investment in innovation.").
76. See, e.g., Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 692 ("The title, and this section of the act,
obviously consider and treat this copyright as property; something that is capable of being
transferred; and the right of the assignee is protected equally with that of the author.'). The Court
in Wheaton noted that the state ofVirginia ''in the year 1785, passed a similar law, for securing to
authors ofliterazy works, an exclusive property therein, for a limited time." Id at 683; see also
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.) ("The entirety of
the copyright is the property of the author, and it is no defence, that another person has
appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property."); Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967,
970 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076) ("Bartlett's right of property in his manuscript may be
transferred or abandoned, the same as any other right of property.' ).
77 . See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 697 ('"The language in the Statute of Anne, which is
considered as vesting the right, is the same as in the act of congress.").
78. See Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 61 7, 620 (18 79) ("As distinct property, separate from the
article created by the original producer or manufucturer, it may not be the subject of sale. But
when the trade-mark is affixed to articles manufactured at a particular establishment and acquires
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that trademarks were valuable to the owners because they signified
the quality of the goods or services and assured the public that the
goods or services offered were the genuine product of the
manufacturers and owners. 79
Although it was well-established that intellectual property was property,
many early tax cases struggled to identify when intangible intellectual property
rights constituted separable property for tax purposes. Such a determination is
critical in numerous tax contexts. For example, application of the asset
capitalization rule to intellectual property development costs hinged on
whether the research activity resulted in an identifiable asset. Application of
early tax depreciation rules to intellectual property acquisition costs centered
on whether an intangible asset existed and whether, in a business acquisition,
the value of the intangible was reasonably determinable. The "property"
question is central to determining the property tax treatment of any disposition.
For instance, preferential capital gain treatment requires a sale of a capital
80
If one could not first conclude that the object of a transfer was
asset.
property, then how could there be a sale-much less a sale of a capital asset
for tax purposes?
As described in this Part, the government and courts often struggled with the
competing concepts of property that could yield different tax results. In some
cases, courts and tax authorities cleverly avoided the property issue when
resolving a particular tax question, which did nothing to guide future decisions.
In some transactional contexts, the approach adopted was to declare attributes
of intellectual property ownership irrelevant and to instead focus on the
tangible medium embodying the intellectual property.
a special reputation in connection with the place of manufacture, and that establishment is
transferred either by contract or operation oflaw to others, the right to the use of the trade-mark
may be lawfully transferred with it.'). In later years, courts permitted transfers of trademarks
together with the associated goodwill, without the need for transfers of the business. See
generally JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390 (2d Cir. 2009); E. & J. Gallo Winery v.
Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1289 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin.,
Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 1982)) (noting that for a trademark assignment to confer rights
on the purchaser, goodwill must accompany the assignment, but "[i]t is not necessary that the
entire business or its tangible assets be transferred"); accord Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham
Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ("A valid transfer of a mark, however,
does not require the transfer of any physical or tangible assets. All that is necessary is the transfer
of the goodwill to which the mark pertains."). For another early decision mentioning trademarks
as property, see Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 6&--67 (1879) ("Trade-marks usually exhibit
some peculiar device, vignette, or symbol, in addition to the name of the party, which the
proprietor had a perfect right to appropriate, and which, as well as the name, is intended as a
declaration to the public that the article is his property.").
79. See Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1883) ("Any one has as
unquestionable right to affix to articles manufactured by him a mark or device not previously
appropriated, to distinguish them from articles ofthe same general character manufactured or sold
by others. He may thus notifY the public of the origin of the article, and secure to himself the
benefits of any particular excellence it may possess from the manner or materials of its
manufucture. His trade-mark is both a sign ofthe quality of the article and an assurance to the
public that it is the genuine product of his manufacture. It thus often becomes of great value to
him, and in its exclusive use the court will protect him against attempts of others to pass off their
products upon the public as his. This protection is afforded not only as a matter ofjustice to him,
but to prevent imposition upon the public.') (citing Trainer, 101 U.S. at 54).
80. See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 54, at 220.
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In the marketplace, copyrights could be divided and the exclusive rights to
81
copyrighted works in one medium of publication could be sold separately
Likewise, trademarks could be divided into separately transferable fractions
82
according to the usage of the market in which the trademarked goods move.
For tax purposes, however, should these marketplace concepts of property (the
splitting up of bundles of rights) be accepted, or should traditional property
concepts (the law relating to the passage of title) be adopted? In determining
the appropriate tax result of a particular intellectual property transfer, the
competing concepts of property could lead to different results. \.Vhile there
was much initial uncertainty and litigation over the divisibility of copyrights,
trademarks, and trade names for tax purposes, most courts eventually focused
on ownership ofbeneficial interests as opposed to legal title.
In the case of copyrights, the Service and some courts initially adopted the
view that a copyright was not divisible into separable properties and that a
grant of less than all the rights conferred by a copyright was not a sale for tax
83
purposes but rather a license.
In one case involving an assignment of the
exclusive motion picture rights to a play that the taxpayer had created, the
Second Circuit adhered to traditional property concepts, stating:
\.Vhen . . the assignee acquires less than the sum of all the
rights which together make up the copyright which as a whole
is property and may be conveyed as such, .
the so-called
assignment amounts only to a license.
Unless the
assignment conveys to the assigned the title to the copyright,
84
no sale of property is made.
Some courts later accepted market concepts and held that a copyright was

81. The Copyright Act of 1976 lists important rights of copyright ownership and provides
that these rights may be subdivided. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see also id § 20l(d)(2)
(providing that "[a)ny ofthe exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision
of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and
owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to ilie extent of iliat
right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to ilie copyright owner by this title'). Under
substantive copyright law, "[c)opyright protection subsists ... in original works of auiliorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression" including "(1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." Id §
102(a).
82. See New York & Rosendale Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 45 F. 212, 212-13
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1891) (" In holding iliat it is necessary to ilie validity of a trade-mark or trade-name
that ilie claimant of it must be entitled to an exclusive right to it, or property in it, we do not mean
to say that it may not belong to more than one person, to be enjoyed jointly or severally.
Copartners, upon a dissolution of partnership may stipulate iliat each ofiliem may use the trade
marks ofilie firm, and there may be many oilier cases ofjoint and several ownership; but such co
owners will together be entitled to ilie exclusive use of the trade-mark, and perhaps each of them
will be entitled to such exclusive use as to all oilier persons except their associates in
ownership.'); Gary H. Moore, Joint Ownership ofIntellectual Property: Issues andApproaches
in Strategic Alliances, 1260 PLI/CoRP 313, 321 (2001) (discussing the practice of several owners
owning ilie same trademark in different fields of use).
83. For ilie Service's view, see I.T. 2735, 12-2 C.B. 131 (1933). For one court's view, see
Goldsmiili v. Comm 'r, 143 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1944), aff'g 1 T.C. 711 (1943).
84. Id at 467.
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85

And the Service later conceded, ruling that a
divisible for tax purposes.
grant (for a lump sum payment) of the exclusive right to exploit a copyrighted
work "in a medium ofpublication throughout the life of the copyright transfers
. h"
a property ng
t and.1s a sa1e c~or tax purposes. 86
In the case of trademarks and trade names, a similar debate occurred over
divisibility and appropriate concepts of property. The monopoly a trademark
or trade name owner is granted by the government is a property right. Such
right may be assigned or transferred, for example, in a limited territory.
Should such a grant, which does not dispose of the entire property of the
grantor, be treated as a sale or a license for tax purposes? Courts addressing
this particular issue generally concluded that sale treatment was proper, even
87
though the grantor retained naked, legal title.
In some difficult cases, courts avoided the property question when resolving
a particular tax conflict involving intellectual property. Consider the issue of
whether the assignment of an abstract idea should be entitled to preferential
capital gain treatment. The Code defines a "capital gain" as gain from the
88
"sale or exchange" of a "capital asset. "
Since 1950, the Code has
specifically excluded from the definition of capital asset "a copyright, a
literary, musical, or artistic composition, ... or similar property, held by a
89
taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property. "
In Regenstein v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, an insurance agent, developed
an idea or plan for selling group life insurance to federal government
90
He sold his plan to an insurance company for $10,000. The
employees.
issue before the court was whether that amount was taxable as ordinary income
91
(the government's argument) or as capital gain (the taxpayer' s argument)
The court concluded that the amount was taxable as ordinary income because
the payment was for services rendered by the taxpayer to the life insurance
92
companies.
Although the court expressed doubt as to whether the taxpayer' s
85. See Gershwin v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 477, 480 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (holding that the
transaction was "a sale of a portion of [the J decedent's rights in the musical composition");
Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 389 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (holding that the transfer to a film
corporation constituted a sale of all the plaintiff's motion pictures rights in the novel).
86. Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the
Service' s ruling applied only if the consideration received was not contingent (i.e., "measured by
a percentage of the receipts from the sale, performance, or publication of the copyrighted work,
[wa)s not measured by the number of copies sold, performances given, or exhibitions made ofthe
copyrighted work, and [wa)s not payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with
the grantee's use ofthe copyrighted work"). Id
87. See, e.g, Rainier Brewing Co. v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 162, 174 (1946), aif'dper curiam, 165
F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948); Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Comm 'r, 6 T.C. 856, 871, affd per
curiam, 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1946) ("We see no inhibition, where a corporation owns a trade
name, to its assigning a right to use that name in a designated territory for a price, and if the right
to use is perpetual and exclusive it is more consistent with the idea of a sale than a lease,
particularly where it is not dissociated from the business or merchandise with which it has been
used.").
88. Id § 1222(3) (2006).
89. See I.R.C. § 122l(a)(3)(A), discussed infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
90. 35 T.C. 183 (1960).
91. See id at 183.
92. See id at 190.
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idea could be considered property, it specifically left the issue undecided and
instead focused on whether the payment was for services rendered by the
93
taxpayer.
In a similar case, Cranford v. United States, the taxpayer conceived and
94
The taxpayer, who was
invented a format or structure for a radio program.
unable to obtain a copyright on either the radio program or the essential feature
of the proposed program, subsequently assigned and conveyed all of his title
and interest in the radio program, conceived and invented by him, to an
umelated company in return for a percentage of payments received by the
company in connection with the licensing of the use of the program. The tax
issue before the court was whether these payments were taxable as ordinary
income (the government's argument) or as capital gains (the taxpayer's
95
argument).
Despite the government's contention that the taxpayer's format
or idea was not property, the court instead focused at length on whether the
radio format was a capital asset; specifically, the court addressed whether the
radio format was "similar" to literary, musical, or artistic compositions and, as
96
The taxpayer argued that his
such, within the capital asset exclusion.
"format" was not copyrightable and was not one of the specifically named
items, and thus, the format was not excluded from the definition of a capital
97
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument and held that the format
asset.
. 1 asset. 98
was not a cap1ta
The courts in Regenstein and Cranford found a way to resolve the tax
disputes at issue but provided an inappropriate framework for similar future
cases. A preliminary issue in each case should have been whether the ideas
constituted property. If they were incapable of being property held by the
taxpayer, then how could there have been a sale-much less a sale of a capital
asset?
The Service avoided the property issue in determining the tax consequences
of using intellectual property in corporate capitalizations. The transfer of
intellectual property to a corporation in exchange for stock in that corporation
99
But a special Code provision, section 351,
is potentially a taxable event
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized upon the transfer by one or
more persons of property to a corporation solely in exchange for stock in such

93. See id. ("While there exists grave doubt here whether petitioner's plan or idea was one
that could be considered to be property, and, further, if it were considered property, whether it
would not come within the exclusion of property similar to a copyright, literary, musical, or
artistic composition, we need not decide these questions, since in our view the facts taken as a
whole support respondent's contention that the payment was for services rendered .
to
Metropolitan and its associated companies.") (citations omitted).
94. 338 F.2d 379 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
95. !d. at 380.
96. !d. at 382.
97. !d. at 381.
98. !d. at 384.
99. The receipt of stock in exchange for property is a realization event for tax pmposes, with
the amount of gain realized equaling the value of the stock received minus the adjusted basis of
the property exchanged. I.R.C. § lOOl(a). As a general rule, the gain is reportable unless an
exception is provided in the Code. Id § lOOl(c).
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corporation if, after the exchange, such person or persons are in control of the
100
An important requirement for nonrecognition treatment under
corporation.
section 351 is that property must be transferred by the shareholder to the
corporation. An issue that arose was whether intangibles, such as technical
know-how, constituted property that could be transferred to a corporation
101
without gain recognition under section 351.
In Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Service took the position that the transfer of
"all substantial rights" in technical know-how would be treated as a transfer of
102
property for purposes of section 351 of the Code.
Soon after announcing its
position, the Service was asked to address whether a nonexclusive license of a
patent was property under section 351. In Revenue Ruling 69-156, the
taxpayer granted certain patent rights in a chemical compound to its foreign
subsidiary corporation in exchange for stock in the subsidiary, retaining for
itself the substantial rights to import, use, and sell the chemical compound in
103
the country in which the subsidiary operated.
The Service concluded that
the transferee subsidiary did not have all substantial rights in the patent, and,
therefore, the grant of the patent ri~hts did not constitute a transfer of property
04
within the meaning of section 351.
In these rulings, the Service skirted the issue of whether intangibles were
property under section 351 and instead focused on whether the grant of
intangibles would constitute a sale rather than a license for capital gain
purposes (i.e., whether the grant consisted of all substantial rights). In the
Service's view, if a transaction did not qualify as a sale for capital gain
purposes, it could not be a transfer of property for section 351 purposes. One
court was quick to eschew this approach. In E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. United States, the United States Court of Claims held that a nonexclusive
105
Determining that
license of patents was property covered by section 351.
section 351 was an autonomous provision, the court declared capital gain
106
concepts (in particular, the sale versus license distinction) irrelevant.
In
holding that the nonexclusive license was property, the court stated: "Both
patents themselves and the exclusive licensing of patents have long been
considered 'property' under 351. It is not a far step to include a non-exclusive
license of substantial value-commonly thought of in the commercial world as
107
a positive business asset. "
A few years after DuPont, the Service changed
its position, stating that it no longer believed that "all substantial rights in
'know-how' or a patent held by the transferor must be transferred in order to
108
constitute the transfer of property for purposes of [section] 351."

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

!d. § 351(a).
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
!d.
Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101.
!d.
47 1 F.2d 1211, 1218 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
!d. at 1217- 18.
!d. at 1218.
See I.R.S. Gen. Corms. Mern. 36,922 (Nov. 16, 1976).
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B. RECONCILING SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES AMONG INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES

The four traditional forms of intellectual property share some common
109
characteristics.
They are all intangible personal property; they have no
110
One cannot really touch them and feel them as one can
physical form.
111
They generally depend on
touch land and feel the texture of the soli
112
physical forms for their creative existence.
For a modem example, the
trademark Coca-Cola written on this page has only slight meaning, but when it
appears on a red beverage can, it becomes a powerful symbol of a globally
113
Likewise, the copyright for Dan Brown's The Da Vinci
recognized product.
Code requires either a book, CD, or other tangible medium embodying the
114
The patent for Viagra needs the actual pills to carry out
words of the novel.
115
The trade secret
the potent effects claimed by the pharmaceutical company.
in the soft drink Coca-Cola is embodied in the brown liquid flowing from the

109. See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTIIY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAlR
CoMPETITION § 6:4 (4th ed. 1997) ("That there are many common characteristics of patents,
trademarks and copyrights cannot be denied. They all share the attributes of personal property,
and are referred to en masse as 'intellectual property' or 'proprietary rights.'"); see also Xuan
Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1267, 1297- 98 (2004)
(describing the common characteristics between trademarks and other types of intellectual
property such as patents, copyrights, and trade secrets).
110. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REv. 1, 34
n.180 (2007) (noting that there is no physical form of intellectual property collateral for the
secured party to seize when the debtor defaults on the loan); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural
Rights: Hegel andIntellec tual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 453,499 (2006) (observing that the
"objects of intellectual property have no separate, natural, empirical existence. They 'exist'
contingently and only insofu as not only their creator, but also other subjects, recognize them as
such."); Kyle Lundeen, Note, Searching for a Defense: The Google Library Litigation and the
Fair Use Doctrine, 75 UMKC L. REv. 265, 280 (2006) (noting that intellectual property has no
physical form).
111. See Darren Hudson Hick, Finding a Foundation: Copyright and the Creative Ac t, 17
TEx. lNTELL. PRoP. L.J. 363, 377 (2009) (noting that "[u)nlike physical property, intellectual
property is not something one can trespass upon").
112. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights lvfanagement
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 537, 538 (2005) (stating that intellectual property is generally
"ern bodied in particular physical forms-on paper, on canvas, on magnetic or optical media-that
can be guarded from a physical theft").
113. See Justin E.D. Daily, Intellectual Property for a Wired World, 11 APR Bus. L. ToDAY
43 , 45 (2002) (''There are relatively few people in this world who do not recognize the Nike
swoosh or the Coca-Cola calligraphy."); A vi J. Stachenfeld & Christopher M. Nicholson, Blurred
Boundaries: An Analysis of the Close Relationship Between Popular Culture and the Practice of
Law, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 903, 906 (1996) (noting Coca-Cola among the few powerful symbols
recognized globally).
114. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics ofDigital Technology, 69 U . CHI. L. REv . 263, 270 (2002) (analogizing that the
distribution of "copyrighted works in the form of books, CDs, and videos was similar to the
distribution ofwine" to the public).
115. See MEIKA LOE, THE RlsE OF VIAGRA: How THE LITILE BLUE PILL CHANGED SEX IN
AMERICA 15 (2004) (observing that after five years ofViagra introduction to the public, the drug
"continued to net over a billion dollars a year"); Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Reports China Has Lifted
Nl'TIMES. COM
(July
8,
2004),
Its
Viagra
Patent,
http :1/www nytirn es.com/ 2004/07/08/business/ pfizer-reports-china-has-hfted-its-viagra
patent htrnl (reporting on patent protection for Viagra and rampant imitations of Viagra in
violation of the patent in Asia).
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tin can or bottle into our bodies to satisfY our thirst and enhance our
.
116
enJoyment.
These four types of intellectual property, though we cannot see them, touch
1 7
They exist wherever the ~hysical or
them, or feel them, are everywhere.
11
digital forms embodying them are transported and in existence.
We can
find a can of Coca-Cola, a pill of Viagra, or a book copy of TheDa Vinci Code
in China, Ukraine, Brazil, France or anywhere else in the world, even in outer
119
space, if the owners take them there.
These four types of intellectual property (the trademark Coca-Cola, the
Viagra patents, the trade secrets in the Coca-Cola drink, and the copyright for
The Da Vinci Code) can easily be duplicated, multiplied, and distributed
120
The intellectual property owners or authorized licensees and
worldwide.
distributors can copyi manufacture, and distribute the products covered by the
121
22
.
123
124
trademark,
patent,
copynght,
and trade secret.
116. See Chris Mercer, Three Charged over Coca-Cola Trade Secrets Theft, DAILY
BEVERAGE (July 6, 2006), http ://www.beveragedaily.com/Industry-Markets!Tirree-charged-over
Coca-Cola-trade-secrets-theft (reporting that the FBI and Coca-Cola caught three people involved
in trade secret theft of Coca-Cola product in liquid containers); Indic tment Handed Down in
Coca-Cola Trade Secret Case, AlLANTA Bu s. CHRON., (July 12, 2006, 12:17 AM),
http://atlanta.bizj ournals.corn/atlanta/stories/2006/07/1O/daily23 htrnl (detailing the Coca-Cola
trade secret theft indictment).
11 7. See Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9: National
and International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 313, 356 (2001) ("Intellectual
property, as an intangible, has no fixed situs. It is simultaneously everywhere ....').
118. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REv. 1155, 1185~86
(2005) (observing the intangible nature of intellectual property); Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright,
Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(Gen) of the Alleged
Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 995~96 (2004)
(noting that a work of authorship, an intangible property protected under copyright law, is
separate from the tangible object in which work is fixed).
119. See Phil Mooney, Coke in Space, CocA-COLA CONVERSATIONS BLOG (Feb. 29, 2008,
11:34 EST), http://www.coca-colaconversations.com/rny~weblog/2008/02/coke-in-space htrnl;
see also The New
World of Coca-Cola, CocA-COLA, http://www.thecoca
colacornpany.com/presscenter/presskit~nwocc~ fucts htrnl (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
120. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchornovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1047-48 (2008) (observing that the intellectual property
law regime recognizes and protects the rights in the "intangible" assets which are apart from the
physical embodiments that are used for marketing purposes); Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kurnis,
A Frameworkfor Understanding Electronic Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. Scr. & TEcH.
277, 309~ 313 (2005) (discussing intellectual property rights and their wide range of
embodiments).
121. SeeK Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 , 326~27 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that "a firm that used its trademark in one business, say
manufacturing cola syrup, could transfer rights to use the trademark in another business, such as
bottling cola-flavored soda"); see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796,
806--D8 (D. Del. 1920); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 272
(1916) ("The right to use a trademark is recognized as a kind of property, of which the owner is
entitled to the exclusive enj oyrnent to the extent that it has been actually used.").
122. The owner of a patent can license its patent to a third party for commercial exploitation,
as it so wishes. "Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system." Dawson Chern. Co. v.
Rohrn & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting "the long-settled view that the essence of a
patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention").
123. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 , 495~96 (2001) (stating that "[t]he 1976
[Copyright] Act recast the copyright as a bundle of discrete 'exclusive rights "' under 17 U.S.C. §
106 and provided that each '"may be transferred ... and owned separately"); see also Fox Film
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The four types of intellectual property, though their physical embodiments
125
are everywhere, share some similarities with respect to exclusivity rights.
That means, if one person, group, or company has the right, no others can have
126
it.
For example, the owner of a trademark has the right to exclude others
from using an identical or similar trademark for the same or similar products or
127
services if the use is likely to cause consumer confusion.
The owner of a
patent can exclude others from using, making, selling, or exporting the
128
The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to
patented products.
make copies, prepare derivative works, distribute the copyrighted work,
129
The owner of a
publicly perform the work, and publicly display the work.
trade secret can bring a misappropriations case against others for unauthorized
130
use of its trade secret.
Despite their similarities, there are many differences among these four types
of intellectual property. Patents and copyrights are unique. Both patents and
copyrights are specific grants dictated by the U.S. Constitution to promote the
131
The constitutional mandate for
progress of science and the useful arts.

Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ('"The owner of1he copyright, if he pleases, may refrain
from vending or licensing and content himself wi1h simply exercising 1he right to exclude o1hers
from using his property.").
124. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 837 (51h Cir. 2004)
(noting provision in 1he license agreement to protect the trade secret in the sale and distribution of
the products).
125. The exclusive rights for intellectual property have been observed as "worthless unless an
owner remains vigilant in 1he policing of potential infringers." Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the
Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States and the People's
Republic ofChina, 7 CH:r.-KENT J. INTELL. PRoP. 95 , 104 (2008).
126. See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TEcH. 381 , 390 (2008) (stating 1hat the most salient characteristic of intellectual
property is the negative right, "setting exclusive rights to particular parties and excluding others
from infringing on their monopoly. Such exclusive rights can be generally transferred, licensed .
. . ."). With respect to patents, "[i)f granted, a patent provides a right to exclude others from
practicing an invention." Engage, Inc. v. Jalbert (In reEngage, Inc.), 544 F.3d 50, 53-54 (1st
Cir. 2008). The court further observes that " [t]his exclusive right is 'a species ofproperty ... of
the same dignity as any other property which may be used to purchase patents."' Id. (quoting
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947) (alteration in
original)).
127. See Peter Lee, The Evolution ofIntellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REv. 39, 39
(2008) (recognizing that ''intellectual property law promotes productivity through allowing
exclusive rights on refined intellectual creations such as source-identifYing marks, particularized
expressions, and specific inventions").
128. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (stating that ''the
Patent Act also declares 1hat ' patents shall have the attributes ofpersonal property,' including 'the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention"' (citing 35
U.S.C. §§ 261, 154(a)).
129. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984)
("[T)he Copyright Act grants the copyright holder 'exclusive' rights to use and to au1horize the
use ofhis work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of copyrighted work in copies.').
130. See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 569 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming jury verdict on copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation); Inter Med.
Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F. 3d 446, 458, 461-63 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming jury
verdict on trade secrets violation claims and vacating excessive damages).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Margaret Chon, Postmodem "Progress":
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 97 (1993); Michael J.
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patents and copyrights speaks volumes as to the intent of the Founders with
. h ts C'lOr a young natlon.
.
132
. no
T h ere 1s
respect to patents and copyng
constitutional mandate for trademarks and trade secrets as with patents and
. h ts. 133 Congress re1"1es on th e Commerce Cause
1
. 1e I, Sectlon
. 8
copyng
of Artlc
134
Congress enacts legislation (e.g., the
to pass federal law on trademarks.
Economic Espionage Act of 1996) to prevent theft of trade secrets and to make
135
such theft a federal crime.
The legal life of a patent is dictated under the federal patent statute and lasts
136
The legal life of a
twenty years from the date of patent application.
copyright under the federal copyright statute sRans the life of the original
37
author plus seventy years after his or her death.
If the author is an entity,
the life of the copyright is 120 years from the date of sublication or 95 years
1 8
from the date of registration, whichever expires first.
For trademarks, the

Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2049 (2009)
(positing that "[u)nder the U.S. Constitution, the legitimacy of the enactment of patent and
copyright law depends on the social (or, if you prefer, political) equation of 'Progress,' the
constitutional standard, with the knowledge that the patent system supports.").
132. See Crane, supra note 125, at 101 ("The framers of the Constitution, familiar with the
limited patent, copyright, and trademark privilege system of England, altered the English practice
to better reflect the new nation's pioneering spirit."); J. Wesley Cochran, It Takes Two to Tango!:
Problems with Community Property Ownership ofCopyrights and Patents in Texas, 58 BAYLOR
L. REv. 407, 425 (2006) (stating that "President Washington urged Congress to enact legislation
to protect copyrights and patents to encourage creative efforts in the new nation, and Congress
responded with the passage ofthe first national patent and copyright statutes").
133. See Trade-Mark Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Stat. 198; Trade-Mark Act of 1881, ch.
138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502. The Trade-Mark Act of 1870 was "[a)n Act to revise, consolidate, and
amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights," and Congress relied on the Patent and
Copyright Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, to enact trademark provisions. Trade-Mark Act of
1870, at 198. Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared that Congress lacked constitutional
power to regulate trademarks under the Patent and Copyright Clause. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 99 (1879). Thereafter, Congress used the Commerce Clause and passed federal
trademark statutes.
134. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et
du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that
"'commerce' under the [Lanham) Act is coterminous with that commerce that Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Oause of the United States Constitution"); Irina D. Manta,
Privatizing Trademarks, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 381, 382 (2009) (restating that the Commerce Clause
provides the Constitutional basis for Congress to pass federal trademark law).
135. See Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing
Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 819 (2003) (observing that the 1996
federal statute does not pre-empt state trade secret law).
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (stating that the patent term is 20 years from an
effective filing date); see also David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and
Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 473 (2003) (posing a question between the legal life
of a patent, which is 20 years from the date of filing the patent application, and the economic life
of a patent). The current legal life of a patent represents a change from seventeen years to twenty
years. See C. Michael White , Why a Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 839, 840
(1956) ("Ideally the legal life of a patent should represent a balance between the additional
incentive ofanother year and the social cost of a longer monopoly.").
137. See Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition ofPublication in Copyright Law,
92 MrnN. L. REv. 1724, 1732-34 (2008) (reviewing the statutory provision for the legal life of
copyright created by natural authors and works made for hire).
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (providing that the copyright term is life of the natural author
plus 70 years; but the work for hire duration is the earlier of 95 years from publication or 120
years from creation); Deborall Tussey, What IfEmployees Owned Their Copyrights?, 2008 MlcH.
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legal hfe lasts as long as the trademark 1s used m commerce to identify a
139
That means
partlcular source and to d1stmgmsh the trademarked products
the life of a trademark can be one year, ten years, or one hundred years. A
trade secret lasts as long as the secret is kept a secret. The trade secret ceases
to have a legal life if the public learns it, causing the trade secret to lose its
140
thus the life of a trade secret is
independent economic value;
141
indeterminable.
Both patents and copyrights are grants wherein the federal government
142
passes law that specifically recognizes exclusive rights for a limited time.
143
For trademarks, both federal and state laws recognize and extend protection.
The Lanham Act of 1946 is the authoritative federal source for trademark
144
States also have trademark laws to regulate, within state
protection.
145
boundaries, trademarks and competitive conduct related to trademarks.
There is no comprehensive federal trade secret statute akin to the federal
1%
.
1~
trademark statute;
each state has 1ts own trade secret laws to regulate.

ST. L. REv. 233, 234 n.6 (2008) (discussing works made for hire duration).
139. See Mark Bartholomew & Jolm Tehranian, The Secret Lifo of Legal Doctrine: The
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1363, 1400 (2006) (stating that trademarks are different from copyrights because the
term ofprotection is ''potentially infinite" due to the duration of use by their owners).
140. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (noting that "[b]ecause of
the intangible nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is defined by the
extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others"); Sean D.
Whaley, "''m a Highway Star": An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS
CoMM. & ENT L.J. 25 7, 272 (2009) (discussing that copyrights and patents enjoy fixed duration
of protection, but trademarks and trade secrets may be valid "in perpetuity as long as certain
criteria are met").
141. See Stephen I. Willis, An Economic Evaluation ofTrade Secrets, 269 PLI/ Pat 737, 752
53 (1989) (emphasizing that the owner of a trade secret can collect royalties from a license
indefinitely).
142. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) ("A copyright, like a patent, is
'at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations
and skill of individuals and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects."')
(internal citations omitted).
143. See Kathryn M. Foley, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive
Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REv. 921, 939-40 (2009) (discussing federal and
state protections for trademarks).
144. See id; Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End ofTrademark Law, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 585, 595--DOO (2008) (reviewing the history of the Lanham Act and expansion of
trademark protection).
145. See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, Is a Rose by Any Other Image Still a Rose? Disconnecting
Dilution's Similarity Test from Traditional Trademark Concepts, 39 U. ToL. L. REv. 591, 598-99
(2008) (noting state trademark protection against dilutive use and how Congress joined states in
enacting the federal Trademark Dilution statute in 1995); Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73
BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1361 (2008) (stating that "in the United States, the federal Lanham Act is
the primary source of trademark protection, though state common law and statutory protections
are also available").
146. See generally Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo
American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RlcH. L. REv. 313 (1997); Christopher Rebel J. Pace,
The Case fora Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 427,442 (1995).
147. See Preseaultv. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (noting that "state
law creates property right in trade secrets for purposes of Fifth Amendment, and regulatory regime
does not pre-empt state property law"); see also Julie Piper, Comment, I Have A Secret?:
Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the
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Most states adopt all or parts of the model trade secret statute to recogmze
trade secrets and define what conduct constitutes misappropriation of a trade
148
Nonetheless, trade secrets are deemed to have more traditional
secret.
149
characteristics of property than the other types of intellectual property.
In developing various tests for analyzing intellectual property transactions,
courts had to reconcile the substantive similarities and differences among the
different types of intellectual property. In some contexts, tax cases emphasized
the substantive similarities among the forms (e.g., grants of monopolies) and
applied the case law that developed relating to one type of intellectual property
15
For example, as described above, early case law established
to other types.
that in order for a transfer of a patent to constitute a sale for tax purposes, all
substantial rights had to be transferred, and that sale treatment could result
even though the consideration received by the transferor was measured by
151
Several courts later used this
production, use, or sale of the patented article.
framework in determining whether or not the transfer of a copyrifht, trade
15
secret, trademark, or trade name constituted a sale for tax purposes.
When confronted with whether a copyright assignment could be denied sale
treatment solely because the purchase price took the form of contingent
payments, the Service relied on its previous position with respect to contingent
payments in patent assignments: "Since the property rights of patents and
copyrights are similar in substance, it is concluded that the Service should
adopt, in the case of copyrights, the position that is being taken in the case of
153
patents."
In analyzing whether or not the transfer of a trade secret meets the sale
requirement, a number of courts applied the tests that had been used in
analyzing patent assignments based on the valid and important similarities
154
While a patent is different from a trade
between a patent and a trade secret.

°

Level ofTrade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PRoP. L. REv. 359, 360 (2008) (discussing the
history of state trade secret law against misappropriation).
148. See generally Michael J. Hutte1, The Case for Adoption ofa Unifonn Trade Secrets Act
in New York, 10 ALB. L.J. Scr. & TEcH. 1, 6-9 (1999) (arguing for New York to depart from
following the Restatement approach to trade secret misappropriation and adopt legislation
modeled afte1 the Uniform Trade Secrets Act); Breana C. Smith et al., Intellectual Property
Crimes, 43 AM. CR1M. L. REv. 663, 679 (2006) (emphasizing the criminal and civil laws
available at the state level against trade secret thefts).
149. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets,
despite their intangible nature, are property rights ''protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment"). For more ''takings" analysis oftrade secrets, see Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312
F. 3d 24, 30-47 (1st Cir. 2002) (en bane) (holding that state requirement of disclosure of cigarette
content was a regulatory taking oftrade secrets); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1,
14 (Cal. 2003) (stating that trade secrets represent "a constitutionally recognized property interest
in information").
150. For substantive similarities, see supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v. Comm'r, 494 F.2d 1340, 1340 (8th Cir. 1974)
(applying framework to trademarks and trade names); Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162, 165
(3d Cir. 1958) (copyrights); Stalke1 Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1962)
(trade secrets).
153. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26.
154. See, e.g., Pickren v . United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1967) (''Secret formulas
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secret (an essential element of the latter is the right in the discoverer to prevent
unauthorized disclosure), an important similarity is that "[t]he value in both
155
lies in the rights they give to their owners for monopolistic exploitation. "
A
patent transfer meets the sale requirement only if the transferor transfers all
substantial rights (e.g. , the right to prevent others from operating under the
156
By analogy, the transfer of a trade secret constitutes a sale only if
patent).
the transferor conveys his or her most important rights-"the right to prevent
unauthorized disclosure and the right to prevent further use of the trade secret
157
by all others."
In analyzing the tax treatment of transfers of trademarks and trade names ,
some courts relied on the tax law that had developed on patent transfers,
158
If a patent transfer was
although such analogies were a bit less helpful.
considered a sale only if the transferor relinquished all substantial rights, then
it would make sense that a trademark transfer should be considered a sale only
if the transferor did not retain significant rights or continuing interests with
respect to the transferred trademark. But what sorts of retained continuing
interests should preclude sale treatment? In a typical trademark or trade name
transfer, it is not uncommon for a variety of conditions to be included in the
transfer agreement. The transferor may retain, for example, certain powers,
rights, or continuing interests in order to maintain some operational control of
the trademark or trade name (e.g., continuing to participate in employee
training or conducting advertising promotions). Without any clear rules, and
with only general analogies to patent cases, early disputes arose between the
Service and transferors of trademarks and trade names over the tax
implications of such retained powers, rights, or continuing interests; numerous
courts were called upon to ascertain when varying conditions in trademark and
trade name agreements were significant enough to preclude sale treatment.
Some of the early cases dealing with the problem of differentiating a sale from
and trade names are sufficiently akin to patents to war1ant the application, by analogy, ofilie tax
law that has been developed relating to the transfer of patent rights, in tax cases involving
transfers of secret formulas and trade names."); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,
288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Stalker Cop., 209 F. Supp. at 33 ("\Vhether or not the transfer
of a trade secret constitutes a sale for tax purposes, the tests used in determining whether or not
there has been a sale of a patent have been applied.").
155. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 288 F.2d at 911 ('"The owner of a patent can make
something which no one else can make because no one else is permitted. But circumstances are
frequently such that the owner of a trade secret can make someiliing which no one else can make
because no one else knows how. The patent owner has a monopoly created by law; the trade
secret owner has a monopoly in fact. In boili cases there exists the possibility of eiilier limited or
complete transfers ofilie right to the exclusive use of an idea.").
156. See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v . Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
157. Stalker Cop., 209 F. Supp. at 34 (stating "[a] transfer of anything less results in a
transaction which is not a sale under the Code").
158. See Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 856, 870-72 (1946), aff'd per
curiam, 165 F.2d 216 (9ili Cir. 1948) (relying on patent cases in analyzing a trade name transfer);
see also Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 388 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ("Since ilie basic nature of
copyrights, patents and trademarks is the same, i.e., grants of monopolies for a fixed period of
time by the Government as a reward for the particular genius of the one receiving the grant, it
would seem that the rights granted in connection with any one ofthem should be treated the same
under the law.').
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a license involved the transfer of Daifl Queen franchises by territorial
15
It was not uncommon for courts to
franchisors to individual subfranchisees.
160
reach different results on virtually identical facts.
At issue in many of the trademark and trade name cases was the effect, if
any, of the contingent payment arrangement. As with patent and copyright
transfers, transfers of trademarks and trade names frequently involve payments
made by the transferee that are payable over a period of time and are
contingent on production. The question was whether the contingent payment
arrangement was inconsistent with the characteristics of a sale. As noted
earlier in this Article, the Service was quick to resolve the issue in patent and
copyright cases-the form of payment should not influence the decision as to
whether a ~atent or copyright assignment is treated as a sale or license for tax
1 1
purposes.
The Service did not employ the same position in trademark and
trade name cases, viewing the receipt of contingent payments as a continuing
economic interest similar to the receipt of royalty income. There was much
diversity of opinion among courts over the issue. The form of payment
influenced some courts to treat the transaction as if it were a license, with the
162
result that the payments were taxable as ordinary income.
Some other
courts did not regard the form of payment to be controlling, with the result that
163
payments received capital gain treatment.
Courts struggled with such
questions as the following: Should contingent payment arrangements be
analyzed apart from the other conditions in the agreement? Does it matter
whether or not the payments were the only form of monetary consideration?
Does it matter whether the transfer agreement was perpetual or not? Analogies
in trademark and trade name cases to patent cases provided little guidance,
highlighting the need for specific tax rules governing trademarks and trade
name assets.
Courts did not always find all types of intellectual property sufficiently
similar to one another to warrant providing them similar treatment under the
tax laws. In considering the deductibility of attorney's fees and other litigation
costs incurred in the pursuit and settlement of intellectual property

159. See Consol. Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436, 438-40 (7th Cir. 1978).
160. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits held that transfers were not sales for tax purposes because
of the rights, powers, and continuing interests retained by the transferor. See United States v.
Wementin, 354 F.2d 757, 766 (8th Cir. 1965) (as to both lump sum and contingent payments);
Moberg v. Comm'r, 310 F.2d 782, 7 83~84 (9th Cir. 1962) (as to three of the four forms of
agreement at issue). However, the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits-in similar transactions
found sales to exist and allowed capital gain treatment. See Moberg v. Comm'r, 305 F.2d 800,
806 (5th Cir. 1962) (as to lump sum payments but not contingent payments); Estate ofGowdey v.
Comm'r, 307 F.2d 816, 818 (4th Cir. 1962) (as to lump sum payment but not contingent
payments); Dairy Queen of Okla., Inc. v. Comm'r, 250 F.2d 503, 506 (lOth Cir. 1957) (as to both
lump sum payment and contingent payments). For a good summary of these cases, see Consol.
Foods Cop. , 569 F.2d at 438-40. See also John H. Hall, Tax Aspects ofFranchising Operations,
in TWENTIETH ANNUAL TULANE TAX lNSTifUTE 102, 111~13 (1971); RichardT. Husseman &
Robert D. Kaplan, Comment, Federal Taxation ofFranchise Sales, 44 WASH. L. REv. 617, 619~
25 (1969).
161. See supra notes 66~ 70, 153 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g, Moberg, 305 F.2d at 338, 340; Estate ofGowdey, 307 F.2d at 818.
163. See, e.g, Moberg, 310 F.2d at 784; Dairy Queen ofOkla. , Inc., 250 F.2d at 506.
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infringement actions, courts focused on the substantive differences among the
intellectual property forms in creating tax distinctions. Under general tax
principles, legal fees incurred in a business or profit-seeking context (e.g.,
those related to the production or collection of taxable income) are deductible
164
Regulations provide
unless they are considered capital expenditures.
examples of nondeductible capital expenditures including the cost of acquiring
property with a "useful life substantially beyond the taxable year" and "[t]he
165
cost of defending or perfecting title to property."
Accordingly, attorney's
fees in a suit to quiet title to land are not deductible, but attorney's fees in a
166
To determine
suit to collect accrued rents on the land are deductible.
whether litigation costs-even if incurred in a business or profit-seeking
activity-are nondeductible capital expenditures, courts focus on the claim's
167
origin and character with respect to which the litigation costs are incurred.
The "origin of the claim" test is not a purely mechanical test; it requires more
168
One must
than focusing merely on the taxpayer' s intent in filing the suit.
also consider "the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation,
the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were
expended, the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the
,169
controversy.
Using this framework to determine the deductibility or capitalization of
intellectual property litigation costs was not an easy task for courts. Should all
intellectual property litigation (e.g., patent infringement, copyright
infringement, and trademark infringement actions) be viewed the same for tax
purposes? If the issues involved, the objectives of the litigation, and the
defenses asserted in each are similar, then a standard based on the origin of the
claim litigated would dictate similar tax treatment of legal costs incurred
viewing all such intellectual property litigation
therein.
"While
generically" has "the unarguable appeal of expediency," it "also ignores the
actual inherent differences and purposes of the various rights and remedies
170
Over time, tax courts struggled to identifY and reconcile the
involved. "
164. See I.R.C. § 162 (2000) (allowing a deduction for ordinary and necessary business
expenses paid or incurred during 1he year in carrying on any trade or business); id § 212
(allowing a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during 1he year for the
production or collection of income and for the management, conversation, or maintenance of
property held for 1he production of income). But see id § 263 (providing 1hat no deduction shall
be allowed for capital expenditures).
165. Treas. Reg.§ 1.263(a)-2(a), (c) (as amended in 1987).
166. Treas. Reg.§ 1.212-l(k) (as amended in 1975).
167. The "origin of 1he claim" test was originally created by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963), and used to determine whe1her litigation costs were
incurred in a business or profit-seeking context or whether the costs were personal. The origin of
the claim standard has also been used to determine whe1her liligation costs--even ifincurred in a
business or profit-seeking activity~are nondeductible capital expenditures. Woodward v.
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 578-79 (1970) (holding 1hat the origin of1he claim 1hat gave rise to the
legal fees was 1he acquisition of stock, and thus, the fees should be capitalized).
168. See Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 7 13 (1973), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 1.
169. !d. The origin of 1he claim test has been used in a number oflower court cases. See,
e.g , Madden v. Comm'r, 514 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 (91h Cir. 1975); Fleischman v. Comm'r, 45
T.C. 439, 444-47 (1966).
170. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 199925012 (June 25, 1999), available at 1999 WL
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distinguishing characteristics of intellectual property when determining the
proper tax treatment of intellectual property litigation costs. In infringement
cases, courts generally concluded that legal fees incurred in patent
171
infringement actions were deductible.
In contrast, legal fees incurred in
trademark infringement actions were not deductible but had to be
172
capitalized.
The apparent distinction was that in patent and copyright
infringement cases, litigation costs are incurred to recover lost profits and
1 73
damages and not to remove cloud of title or defend ownership of property
In trademark and trade name infringement cases, litigation costs "resemble the
cost of perfecting or preserving title to property, a cost well established as
. 1 expen d.1tures. ,174
cap1ta
C. ESTABLISHING SIGNIFICANCE OF TANGIBLE MEDIUM EMBODYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

As described earlier, the traditional forms of intellectual property-patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets-generally depend on tangible forms
175
for their creative existence.
For example, the patent for a drug needs the
actual pills to carry out the potent effects claimed by the patent owner and the
copyright for an author's novel requires either a book, CD, or other tangible
medium embodying the words of the novel. Though we cannot see, touch, or
feel patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, they are everywhere and
exist wherever the tangible or digital forms embodying them are transported
and in existence. They can be easily duplicated, multiplied, and distributed
worldwide.
Because intellectual property depends on tangible forms for its creative
existence, an important tax issue is whether tangible medium embodying
intellectual property should be significant in determining the tax treatment of
intellectual property. The government has not always taken a consistent
approach.
In determining the tax consequences of certain intellectual property
transactions, the government has largely ignored the legal attributes of
intellectual property, instead deeming significant the tangible medium
embodying the intellectual property. An example in which the tax treatment of
a transaction depends on the tangible medium embodying intellectual property
424839.
171. See, e.g , Urquhartv. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 17, 120 (3d Cir. 1954).
172. See, e.g., Medco Prods. Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 523 F.2d 137, 139 (lOth Cir. 1975);
Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 360, 361--62 (2d Cir. 1964). But see J.R. Wood & Sons, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038 (1962) (holding costs of unsuccessful trademark infringement
currently deductible).
173. Litigation costs in patent infungement actions are deductible even though the defense of
invalidity of patent claims is normally raised and disposed of first. See Urquhart, 215 F.2d at 20-
21.
174. Danskin, Inc., 331 F.2d. at 361 ('The purpose and effect of the legal expenses ... was to
increase the value of taxpayer's registered trademark and to make more secure taxpayer's
property in it by forever eliminating the possibility of having it impaired by the competitive use
of this confusingly similar mark.").
175. See supra notes 112- 16 and accompanying text.
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involves the exchange of intellectual property. As a general rule, the exchange
of one type of intellectual property for a different type of intellectual property
is a realization event potentially subject to taxation with the amount of gain
equal to the difference between the value of the intellectual property received
176
and the adjusted basis of the intellectual property given in the exchange.
However a special nonrecognition rules applies to "like kind" exchanges of
177
property.
Specifically, no gain need be recognized if business or
investment property is exchanged sole~ for property of a "like kind" to be held
17
for use in business or investment.
Under the approach adopted by the
Treasury, whether intellectual property is of a like kind to other intellectual
property depends not only on "the nature or character of the [intangible] rights
involved (e.g., a patent or a copyright), [but] also on the nature or character of
179
the underlying {tangible asset] to which the {intellectual] property relates."
Accordingly, if a taxpayer "exchanges a copyright on a novel for a copyri?ht
80
on a different novel," then "[t]he properties exchanged are of a like kind."
On the other hand, if a taxpayer exchanges a copyright on a novel for a
copyriftht on a song," then "[t]he properties exchanged are not of a like
1
kind. "
A second example is the tax treatment of software development costs. One
approach to software development costs would be to prescribe different tax
treatments depending on the protection sought (e.g., patent, copyright, trade
secret). In other words, if developed software were protected as a patent, then
the development costs would be treated the same as costs of developing any
patentable invention. If, on the other hand, the software were protected only as
a copyright, then the development costs would be treated the same as costs of
developing any copyright (e.g., copyrighted novel, copyrighted song). Without
clear rules, the Service adopted a different approach-one that ignores the
form of intangible intellectual protection sought and instead focuses on the
182
subject of protection.
Under a longstanding administrative ruling, software
development costs are treated the same (i.e., currently deductible) regardless of
183
whether the software is patented, copyrighted, or protected by trade secret.
A third example is the tax treatment of advertising expenditures that produce
intellectual property rights of a long-term nature (e.g., graphic designs,
package designs). As a general rule, the government allows taxpayers to
currently deduct advertising costs notwithstanding the fact that advertisi~
1
often produces benefits that continue well beyond the current taxable year.

176. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (providing 1he amonnt of gain is the excess of the amonnt
realized over 1he adjusted basis of1he property transferred).
177. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2006).
178. !d.
179. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1031(a)-2(c)(as amendedin2005).
180. !d. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), Ex. 1.
181. !d. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), Ex. 2.
182. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, superseded and updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50,
2000-2 C.B. 601.
183. !d.
184. After the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79
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"Only in the unusual circumstance where advertising 1s directed towards
obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those traditionally associated
with ordinary [product, institutional,] or goodwill advertising, must the costs .
185
. be capitalized."
Advertising expenditures often create intellectual
property rights in trademarks and trade dress (the total image and overall
appearance of a product), as such rights are based on use in commerce and
often encompass the costs of creating copyrightable advertising materials. An
interesting question is whether these long-term intangible benefits should serve
as the basis for requiring capitalization of advertising campaign expenditures.
Or, should such costs be deductible because they resulted from advertising
activities?
186
In one case,
a tax court allowed trade dress and copyright development
costs to be deducted even though such costs in a non-advertising context would
most likely have to be capitalized. The taxpayer incurred substantial costs in
developing an advertising campaign-namely expenses relating to the creation
of graphic designs and package designs for the packagin9 of its cigarette
87
products-and sought to deduct such campaign expenditures.
The taxpayer
188
also sought to deduct the costs of executing the campaign.
Although the
government conceded that the advertising execution expenses were deductible,
it argued that the advertising campaign expenditures should be capitalized.
The government's argument was that the campaign expenditures provided
long-term benefits that were not traditionally associated with ordinary business
advertising. The graphic design and package design costs provided legal rights
and economic interests of a long-term nature-the legal rights being the
statutory rights and common-law trademark rights that attach to trade dress and
189
the economic interest being the associated brand equity.
In addition, the
taxpayer received lon~-term copyright protection for its copyrightable
19
advertising materials.
The court rejected the government's argument and
held that graphic and package design costs incurred by the taxpayer were not
required to be capitalized but were deductible as ordinary product
. . 191
advertlsmg.

(1992), current deductibility of advertising costs was nncertain because most adveltising gives
rise to long-term benefits. In Revenue Ruling 92-80, however, the Service ruled that INDOPCO,
Inc. "[would] not affect the treatment of advertising costs as business expenses which are
generally deductible nnder section 162 ofthe Code." Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
185. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
186. RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1988), action on dec., 1999-012
(Oct. 4, 1999).
187. "A 'graphic design' ... is a combination of verbal information, styles of print, pictures
or drawings, shapes, patterns, colors, spacing, and the like that make up an overall visual display.
The term 'package design' ... refers to the design of the physical construction of the package."
Id at 73.
188. Adveltising execution expenditures were defined by the Service as costs of executing the
adveltising campaign (e.g., costs ofproduction oftelevision commercials). Id
189. Id at 83.
190. Id at 84.
191. Id at 84-85. In a 1999 action on decision, the Service did not acquiesce to the court's
decision in RJR Nahisco Inc. and annonnced that it would continue to litigate the treatment of
package design costs where appropriate. Id, action on dec., 1999-012 (Oct. 4, 1999) ("Rev. Rul
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In the vast majority of cases, the nature of the developed intangible benefits
and the length of legal protections are significant in determining tax results.
However, such legal attributes have been rendered completely irrelevant in
certain contexts. As demonstrated here, a company must generally capitalize
copyright development costs, but it does not have to capitalize costs if the
subject of the copyright is software or if the copyright is the product of
advertising activities. Relying on intellectual property attributes in some
contexts and disregarding them in others creates incoherent distinctions in tax
law.

IV. THREE GOALS OF SPECIFIC TAX RULES GOVERNING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Congress began enacting intellectual property tax rules in the 1950s. As a
result of tax legislation over the past five decades, the Code now contains
several special rules that govern different types of intellectual property. A few
of the s~ecial provisions apply equally to a large group of intellectual property
1 2
Most, however, are mutually exclusive, gov erning specific forms of
assets.
193
intellectual property.
In applying these rules, it is helpful to understand as
much as possible about why they exist and how they fit into or conflict with
sound policy. Here, each ofthe special rules is described in terms of its stated
policy objectives. While a few of the provisions were designed to encourage
certain intellectual property activities, the vast majority of the special rules
were enacted on an ad hoc basis with particular tax goals in mind: (1) to close
tax loopholes and remove tax inequities, or (2) to simplifY rules and eliminate
tax uncertainties that existed under general tax principles.
A SUPPORTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC

GROWTH
1. Tax Incentives for Patent Development Activities
In a few cases, special legislation was designed to support intellectual
property growth and incentivize desirable intellectual property activity. In
1954, Congress enacted two provisions primarily to encourage research
194
activity and to stimulate economic growth and technological development.
92-80 should not be read as a concession that package design costs are advertising and, therefore,

deductible."). For the Service's position, see Rev. Proc. 2002-9, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327 (app. 3.01);
Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-2 C.B. 448; Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85. In 2004, the
Treasury Department issued regulations permitting a deduction for the costs of creating package
designs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v) (2004) (providing that an amount paid to create a
package design is not treated as an amount that creates a separate and distinct intangible asset). It
should be noted that although a taxpayer can deduct the costs of developing a package design, the
taxpayer must capitalize the costs of obtaining trademarks and copyrights on elements of the
package design (i.e., the fees paid to a government agency to obtain trademark and copyright
protection on certain elements ofthe package design). Id § 1.263(a)-4(1), Ex. 9(i).
192. See, e.g, I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(6), 170(e)(l)(B)(iii), 170(m), 197(d)(l) (2006).
193. See, e.g , id §§ 41, 167(f)(l), 167(g)(8), 174, 1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, 1253.
194. Id § 174(a) (1954) (allowing taxpayers to treat research or experimental expenditures as
expenses not chargeable to capital account as long as those expenditures are paid or incurred in
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Section 174 of the Code permits taxpayers to deduct immediately certain
research and development expenditures that might otherwise have to be
195
capitalized.
Section 1235 provides statutory assurance to certain individual
inventors that the sale of their patents will qualify for reduced capital gain
196
More specifically, the special rule guarantees capital gain rates, as
rates.
opposed to higher ordinary income tax rates, for any transfer of all substantial
197
rights to a patent by certain holders to umelated parties.
Working together,
these two rules permit an inventor to deduct research costs when incurred and
198
then enjoy a low capital gains tax on the later sale ofthe resulting invention.
To encourage firms to actually increase their research expenditures over
199
time, Congress enacted a special credit.
The credit currently found in
section 41 of the Code is incremental in that it is equal to a certain percentage
of qualified research spending above a base amount, which can be thought of
200
as a firm's normal level of research and development investment
The credit
connection wi1h 1he taxpayer's trade or business); id § 263(a)(l)(B) (providing that the
capitalization rules under section 263(a) do not apply to research or experimental expenditures
deductible under section 174(a)).
195. Id; see H.R. REP. No. 1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 401 7, 4053; 100
CoNG. REc. 3,425 (1954) (statement of Chairman Reed: "This provision will greatly stimulate the
search for new products and new inventions upon which 1he future economic and military
streng1h of our Nation depends. It will be particularly valuable to small and growing
businesses."); see also Alexander, supra note 22, at 549 (noting a primary reason for enacting
section 174 was to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal subsidy of
research and development start-ups); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research and
Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEo. L.J. 347, 349 (1987) (explaining 1hat
Congress decided to provide taxpayers wi1h the option of an immediate deduction in order to
encourage new research and development); Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War
against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 andHigh-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REv. 625,
694 (1990) ("The deduction election under section 174(a) is intended to encourage research and
development activities by allowing 1he cost of such activities to be used to offset 1he income
earned in the business at the earliest possible date.').
196. I.R.C. § 1235 (2010); seeS. REP. No. 83-1622, at 439 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (stating a policy goal underlying section 1235 ' s enactment was "to
provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of1he Nation").
197. I.R.C. § 1235.
198. A related incentive for inventors is 1he exemption from the general ''recapture" rules of
section 1245. I.R.C. § 1245 (2006). Under section 1245, any gain recognized on 1he disposition
of intangible personal property must be reported as ordinary income-not capital gain-to the
extent of any deductions (e.g., depreciation and amortization) taken wi1h respect to 1he property.
Id § 1245(a)(l). In oilier words, any part of 1he gain that is attributable to depreciation or
amortization deductions previously attributable to 1he transferred property must be recaptured as
ordinary income and taxed at ordinary rates, whereas any part of 1he gain that is attributable to
economic appreciation may be taxed at capital gains rates. See id Al1hough intangible personal
property is generally subject to recapture, Newton Insert Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 570, 587
(1974), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1259 (91h Cir. 1976), 1he government has clarified in an administrative
pronouncement 1hat inventions, 1he creation costs ofwhich were expensed under section 174, are
not subject to section 1245 recapture, Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84 (providing 1hat section
174(a) deductions need not be recaptured as ordinary income on later sale). Thus, the entire
amount of gain recognized by an inventor on a later sale--gain attributable to research and
experimental costs expensed under section 174, as well as gain attributable to true economic
appreciation in value of 1he invention-may receive preferential capital gains treatment under
section 1235.
199. Id Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241
(1981) (establishing original research credit at I.R.C. § 44F (1981)).
200. The credit is 20% of qualified research expenditures in excess of a base amount 1hat is a
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is temporary and has been extended more than a dozen times since its
enactment in 1981.
These three tax provisions, sections 41 , 174, and 1235, clearly reflect a
policy decision to incentivize the development of patents and patent-like
property. Trade secrets and know-how that have potential for patentability
should fall within the scope of these incentives. Section 174 regulations define
deductible research and experimental expenditures broadly to include all costs
incident to product development or improvement, which includes "any pilot
C'
1a, mventwn,
.
.
.
. .1 ar property. ,201
rna de,1 process, 10rmu
tee hmque,
patent, or s1m1
Section 1235 regulations provide that no patent or patent application need be
currently in existence, suggesting that an inventor can receive capital gain
202
treatment for patentable, or patent-like, property.

2. Tax Rules Applicable to Other Intellectual Property Development Activities
The three tax incentives for patents and patent-like property do not apply to
20 3
other forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights and trademarks.
While costs of developing these types of intellectual property must generally
204
be capitalized,
several exceptions have been carved out.
One exception from the capitalization requirement can be found in section
263A(h). That special provision, enacted in 1988, permits certain freelance
writers, photographers, and artists to deduct "gualified creative expenses" that
205
would otherwise have to be capitalized.
The stated purpose of the
exception was not to promote freelance activities but rather to relieve writers,
photographers, and artists from the burden of the capitalization rules,
206
especially when their activities may not generate income for years.
A second exception from capitalization pertains to advertising expenditures
that result in trademark and copyright protections. As discussed earlier, such

"fixed-base percentage" of the taxpayer's average annual gross receipts for the four preceding tax
years. For established finns, the fixed-base percentage is generally based on a ratio of the
taxpayer's qualified research expenses to its gross receipts for years 1984 to 1988, capped at 16%.
For start-up firms, the fixed-base percentage is set at 3% during the finn's first five tax years with
spending on qualified research and gross receipts. In no event shall the base amount be less than
50% of the qualified research expenses for the credit year.
201. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 74-2(a)(1H2) (as amended in 1994).
202. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (1957); see Gilson v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 922 (1984)
(allowing patent tax treatment even though only two of eight designs were patented).
203. See Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(3) (1960) (prohibiting deduction of expenditures for
"literary, historical, or similar projects"); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 439-40 (1954), reprinted in
1954 U .S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082.
204. I.R.C. § 263A (2006) (requiring capitalization of expenditures in connection with
copyrightable subject matter); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b) (2004) (requiring capitalization of
costs of obtaining rights from a governmental agency, as well as costs of creating any "separate
and distinct intangible asset").
205. I.R.C. § 263A(h), enacted as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6026, 102 Stat. 3342, 3691 - 92 (1988). A qualified creative
expense is defrned as any expense "paid or incurred by an individual in the trade or business of .
. being a writer, photographer, or artist," which, except for the uniform capitalization rules of
section 263A, would be otherwise deductible for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(2)(A).
206. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at 145 (1988) (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5205.

6 / 14 /2011 8:37AM

NGUYENMAINE W KG

138

SMU LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 64

costs are currently deductible as general advertising even though such costs
207
provide benefits of a long-term nature.
A third exception from the capitalization requirement pertains to software
development costs. Also discussed earlier, such costs are currently deductible
208
regardless of the type of intellectual property protection on the software.
It
should be noted that although these exceptions permit certain taxpayers to
deduct actual creation and development costs (e.g., costs of writing a book,
costs of developing a package design, costs of developing software), taxpayers
are required to capitalize fees paid to any government a~ency to obtain
09
trademark and copyright protections on the developed product.
B. ELIMINATING LOOPHOLES AND REMOVING TAX INEQUITIES

1. Tax Rules Governing Copyright Sales
On several occasions, Congress has enacted provisions to close loopholes or
remove tax inequities that existed under general tax rules. In the earliest
example, in 1950, Congress enacted section 1221(a)(3) of the Code to close a
210
loophole with respect to capital gain treatment on certain copyright sales.
Prior to the enactment of section 1221 (a)(3 ), the tax treatment of a sale of a
copyright depended on the professional status of the writer, author, or
photographer. For example, if the author of a book was a professional writer,
the sale of the copyright for the book resulted in ordinary income because
inventory is not considered a "capital asset," a requirement for capital gain
211
treatment
If the author was an amateur, however, the book was considered
a capital asset, and the sale resulted in capital gain. To remove the loophole
and provide uniform ordinary income treatment for the sale of self-created
property, Congress added section 1221(a)(3) to exclude from the capital asset
definition a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar
212
property held by the creator.
This exclusion created a level playing field for
professional and amateur copyright creators alike. It was also consistent with
the idea of taxing wages and salaries as ordinary income.
Ironically, the 1950 law, which was designed to treat all copyright creators

207. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(l)(ii), (d)(5), (/), Ex. 9 (requiring capitalization of costs of
obtaining certain rights from a governmental agency).
210. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 933 (codified as
amended in I.R.C. § 122l(a)(3) (2006)).
211. I.R.C. § 122l(a)(l) (excluding from the definition of capital asset inventory or property
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his or her trade or
business).
212. See S. REP. No. 81-2375 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053 , 3097. The
capital asset exclusion for self-created property does not apply to non-individual creators, such as
corporations whose employees or independent contractors created the copyrights. See Rev. Rul.
55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, superseded by Rev. Rul. 62-141, 1962-2 C. B. 181 (applying inventory
exclusion, but not copyright exclusion, suggesting that the copyright exclusion does not apply to
works-for-hire creations); see also Desilu Plods., Inc. v. Comm 'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (1965)
(same).
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the same, was later viewed by some~particularly members of the country
music industry~as quite harsh to songwriters. Because the average annual
income of songwriters was quite low and often came in spurts, some thought
the taxing of gains realized from song sales should differ from the taxing of
213
compensation earned by wage earners.
In response, in 20 06, Congress
amended the 1950 law, creating an exception for sales of musical compositions
214
and copyrights in musical works
Under section 1221(b)(3), songwriters
can elect to pay tax at capital gain rates rather than ordinary income rates on
215
the sales of their copyrighted songs.
Although this exception was pushed to
remove perceived tax inequity facing songwriters, it could more accurately be
viewed as a response to assiduous lobbying efforts by the music industry.

2. Tax Rules for Trademark and Trade Name Expenditures
To eliminate inequities facing small businesses that owned trademarks and
. 177 m
. 19 56. 216 Be1ore
"'"
tra de names, Congress enacted sectwn
the enactment
of section 177, expenditures paid in connection with trademarks and trade
21 7
and were not
names, such as legal fees, were not currently deductible
recoverable under early tax depreciation rules because trademarks and trade
218
Certain large corporations, which
names have indeterminable useful lives.
had in-house legal staff handling trademark and trade name matters, were
avoiding this result by deducting compensation with respect to these matters
because of difficulties of identification. Smaller companies, which could not
afford to maintain their own legal staff, had to pay outside counsel or
consultants to perform functions related to trademarks and trade names and
were required to capitalize such expenses. Section 1 77 was enacted as an
attempt to eliminate the existing hardship and inequities facing small
219
It allowed a taxpayer to elect to depreciate over sixty months
corporations.
certain costs incurred in connection with the acquisition, protection , expansion,

213. See Brady Mullins, Music to Songwriters' Ears: Lower Taxes: Country Artists' Group
Presses Lawmakers to Slash the Levy on Lyricists, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 29, 2005, at A4 (quoting
Bart Herbison, executive director of 1he Nashville Songwriters Association International). For
criticism of this argument and government response, see James Edward Maule, I Sing a Song of
Taxes, a Pockeifill of Cries, MAULEDAGAIN BLOG (Nov. 30, 2005, 10:39 AM),
http://mauledagain.blogsport.com/2005 _11_0 1_archive html.
214. See Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, §
204(a)(3), 120 Stat. 345 (2006), amended by Tax Relief and Heal1h Care Act of2006, Pub. L. No.
109-432, § 412, 120 Stat. 2922; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 94 (2006) (Conf Rep.),
reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234, 292.
215. Specifically, I.R.C. § 122l(b)(3) (2006) provides 1hat, at 1he election of a taxpayer, the
section 122l(a)(l) and (a)(3) exclusions from capital asset status do "not apply to musical
compositions or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in
[section 122l(a)(3)]".
216. Act ofJune 29, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-629, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 406 (1956).
21 7. For treatment of litigation costs incurred in trademark and trade name infringement
cases, see supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. For treatment oflitigation costs incurred
in defending cancellation of a trademark, see Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 287
(41h Cir. 1973) (holding that attorney's fees incurred in defending cancellation of a trademark
were nondeductible capital expenditures).
218. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
219. S. REP. No. 84-1941, at3-4 (1956).
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220

registration, or defense of a trademark.
221
Section 177 was repealed in 1986.
The tax rule for trademark and trade
name expenditures was viewed as inappropriate for a number of reasons: the
possibility that large companies were finding a way to deduct otherwise capital
expenditures did not justify an amortization election for all; a five-year
amortization only partially alleviated any unfairness; and there was no basis for
a presumption that investment in trademarks and trade names produced social
222
benefits that market forces might adequately reflect.

3. Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions ofIntellectual Property
In its most dramatic effort to alleviate unfairness and close a tax loophole,
Congress amended on two occasions the charitable deduction rules for
223
Since 1917, the government has provided a
intellectual property donations.
financial incentive for taxpayers to transfer property to charities by giving
224
Historically, the
taxpayers an immediate tax deduction for their donations.
amount of the taxpayer' s charitable contribution deduction was the fair market
225
value of the property contributed.
By granting an immediate deduction
equal to the fair market value of the donated property, the charitable deduction
provided an important economic incentive for patentees, authors, and artists to
donate their ~atents and creative works to further the work of charitable
26
The deduction served as an important incentive for writers,
organizations.
artists, and photographers to make in-kind donations to museums, libraries,
227
Similarly, it was a vital tool
universities, and other charitable organizations.
for the transfer of technology from research corporations to research
universities and other nonprofit donees where the technologies could be
. d proper1y. 228
exp1mte
220. I.R.C. § 177 (repealed 1986).
221. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 24l(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2181 (1986).
222. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 256 (1986).
223. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004).
224. See Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2)(a), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917)
(allowing charitable tax deduction for contributions by individuals); see also Revenue Act of
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(r), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935) (allowing charitable tax deduction
for contributions by corporations). For the modem day statutory provision, see I.R.C. § 170
(2006).
225. See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C. B. 126 ("The fair market value of an undivided present
interest in a patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an organization described
in section 170(c) ... constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitable contribution, to the extent
provided in section 170, in the taxable year in which such property is contributed."); see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-l(c) (2010) ("If a charitable contribution is made in property other than
money, the amount of the contribution is the fuir market value of the property at the time of the
contribution reduced as provided in section 170(e)(l) ....'); H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated
property to charity was allowed a deduction for fair market value ofproperty).
226. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(l) (2006).
227. See id. § 170(c)(2)(b).
228. Large corporations with research and development facilities often develop patents that
later become inconsistent with their missions or core technologies, that are inappropriate for
licensing to third parties, or that have no value (for defensive purposes) in competitive markets.
See RoN LAYTON & PETER BLOCH, IP DoNATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 5 (2004).
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The government defined "fair market value" as "the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable
229
knowledge of relevant facts."
The government, however, never fully
articulated or formalized a standard or ap2roach for determining the fair
230
market value of donated intellectual property
As a consequence, valuation
conflicts between donors and the government increasingly occurred as
intellectual property wew in value and the practice of intellectual property
2
donations also grew.
In its first major attack on intellectual property donations, Congress took
significant measures to curtail the availability of immediate tax benefits for
232
contributions of copyrights by creators.
Section 170(e), added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, reduced the amount of the charitable deduction from fair
233
Because copyright
market value to the creator's basis in the copyright
creators typically have a zero basis, or very low basis, in their copyrighted
works, the amendment effectively precluded artists, musicians, photographers ,
and other copyright creators from enjoying any tax benefit from their
234
charitable donations.
235
It had no effect
The 1969 amendment impacted only copyright creators.
on copyright purchasers who later donated their intellectual property.
Similarly, the amendment had no effect on other forms of intellectual:8roperty,
6
This
such as patents, trademarks, trade names, and computer software.
created questionable distinctions in the tax system. Art collectors and
investors were entitled to deduct the fair market value of their tangible
property donations, but artists were entitled to deduct only their basis in their
237
donated self-created works.
Likewise, patent developers were entitled to
deduct the fair market value of their donated patents, but copyright creators
238
These
were entitled to deduct only the basis in their donated copyrights.
distinctions remained in the Code for thirty-five years until Congress's second

229. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 70A-1(cX2) (2010).
230. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(b) (2006).
231. Sean Conley, Paint a New Picture: The Artist-Museum Partnership Act and the Opening
ofNew Markets for Cmritable Giving, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. L. 89, 93
(2009).
232. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 555 (1970).
233. !d.
234. An artist's basis in her copyrighted artwork, for instance, is the cost of the brushes,
canvases, pencils, or paper to the extent not previously deducted.
235. See STAFF OF THE JOlNT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 17 1-72 (Comm. Print 1970).
236. !d.
23 7. As one notable artist stated: "If anyone else buys my painting for $2, he can then give it
to a museum and deduct $10,000 from his taxes, if that is the market value of the piece. If I
myself donate it, I get $2 tax credit, because that is what the paint and the canvas cost." Burgess
J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Artists, Tax Collectors, and Private Foundation Status, 103 TAX
NoTEs 195, 195 n.1 (2004) (quoting artist Ettore DeGrazia, who gained notoriety after he burned
over 100 ofhis oil paintings over frustration with tax treatment of successful artists).
238. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(b)(iii) (2006).
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239
major attack on intellectual property donations in 2004.
As patents became increasingly valuable assets and patent donations
flourished, the government became increasingly concerned over valuation
abuses by patent donors, and courts were increasingly confronted with
240
valuation disputes.
In 2004, in a drastic and hasty move, Congress
amended the charitable deduction provision by eliminating the fair market
value standard for contributions of most forms of intellectual property,
241
reducing the initial amount a donor may deduct.
As with the 1969
legislation impacting self-created copyrights, the 2004 legislation limited the
initial charitable deduction of any type of intellectual property to the property's
242
tax basis.
Often the donor's tax basis in intellectual property is very small;
in many cases, the donor's basis is zero because development costs are often
243
deducted when incurred.
To encourage charitable giving of intellectual
property, Congress deemed it appropriate to grant donors of intellectual
property future charitable deductions based on the income received by the
244
donee charity.
Specifically, the donor can take a deduction for up to ten
245
years for gifts of royalty-producing intellectual property to public charities.
The amount of the charitable deduction is a percentage of the royalty income
.
247
earned b y t h e donee. 246 Th e percentage d ec 1"mes over tlme.
C. SIMPLIFYING RULES AND IMPROVING CLARITY OF TAX RESULT

In many instances, special tax rules were enacted to reduce procedural
dissonance that occurred upon the application of general tax rules to
248
intellectual property
As explained earlier, numerous disputes between
taxpayers and the government arose over the proper tax treatment of
intellectual property development and acquisition costs as well as over the
239. See American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 1, 118 Stat. 1418.
240. In Notice 2004-7, the Service stated that "some taxpayers that transfer patents or other
intellectual property to charitable organizations are claiming charitable contribution deductions in
excess ofthe amounts to which they are entitled" and warned that ''the Service intends to disallow
improper charitable contribution deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer
of patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations." I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004
1 C.B. 310. A number of courts had also been addressing valuation disputes. See, e.g, Smith v.
Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981), ajj'd, 691 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the
value of a donated patent was $3,500, although patent donor claimed charitable deduction in
excess of$200,000).
241. American Jobs Creation Act, § 1. The 2004 legislation applies to most forms of
intellectual property including patents, certain copyrights, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets
and know-how, certain software, and similar intellectual property or applications or registrations
ofsuch property. H.R. REP. No. 108-548, at 360, 362 (2004).
242. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-1 C.B. 310.
243. See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006), discussed supra notes 195, 201 and accompanying text.
244. I.R.C. § 170(m)(3).
245. !d. § 170(m)(5).
246. !d. § 170(m)(7).
247. !d. § 170(mX1), (7). The deduction under section 170(m) is subject to the percentage
limits in section 170(b)(l)(A) and is reduced by the amount of the deduction allowed in the year
of the gift. !d. § 170(m)(2), (10)(A).
248. SeeS. REP. No. 83-1622, at 112 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747; S.
REP. No. 91-552, at 198-99 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2243-44.
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. . proceed s. 249 There
. 11 ectua1 property d.1spos1t1on
proper tax treatment of mte
also existed considerable diversity of opinion among the courts over how to
apply Beneral tax principles to increasingly valuable intellectual property
0
assets.
On several occasions, Congress enacted federal legislation to
.1mprove c1anty
. of tax resu1t. 251

1. Tax Rules for Patent Development and Assignments
In the earliest example, Congress enacted in 1954 sections 174 and 1235,
which helped to eliminate uncertainties over the proper tax treatment of patent
252
development costs and patent assignments.
Section 174 allows taxpayers to
elect to immediately deduct qualified research expenditures that would
253
otherwise be capitalized.
While the primary justification for the special
deduction was to encourage new research and development activity and
254
another
stimulate economic growth and technological development,
justification was to reduce uncertainties caused by a~plying the asset
25
capitalization rules to research and development activities.
Section 1235 provides some bright-line rules for determining when a patent
transfer will qualif~ for reduced capital gain rates as opposed to ordinary
2 6
income tax rates.
While it was intended to encourage research and
development that potentially leads to patentable inventions, it was also an
attempt to reduce uncertainty and minimize disputes over the application of
257
general tax principles to patent transfers
When applicable, section 1235
provides statutory assurance that a patent transfer will not be deemed a license
258
merely because of the existence of contingent payments.
It eliminates
uncertainty over whether a patent transferor is an amateur, who is eligible for

249. Gregory M. Beil, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy Over
the Amortization ofAcquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MlAMI L. REv. 731, 734 (1995).
250. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 198.
251. See I.R.C. §§ 174(a), 1235(a).
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 195, 201 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 195.
255. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text. See DavidS. Hudson, The Tax Concept
of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 85, 88-89 (1991) (explaining that another
justification for section 174 is that the capitalization rule is difficult to applying to research and
development costs); George Mundstock, Taxation ofBusiness Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 11 79, 1258-59 (1987) (stating a reason for enacting section 174 was to reduce uncertainty
caused by applying the asset-capitalization rules to research and development).
256. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text
25 7. SeeS. REP. No. 83-1622, at 422 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621 , 5082. A
stated policy goal underlying § 1235's enactment is "to provide an incentive to inventors to
contribute to the welfare of the Nation." Id.
258. See I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2006) (providing that section 1235 applies regardless of whether
the payments received are payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the
transferee's use of the patent or are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
property transferred); see also S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 422 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621 , 5082 (stating that section 1235 was intended ''to give statutory assurance to
certain patent holders that the sale of a patent (whether as an 'assignment' or 'exclusive license')
shall not be deemed not to constitute a 'sale or exchange' for tax purposes solely on account of
the mode ofpayment.").
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capital gain treatment under general tax principles, or a professional inventor
25 9
who is not eligible for capital gain treatment under general tax principles.
And, it eliminates the need to ascertain the holding period of an invention for
purposes of meeting the requisite one-year holding period under the general
260
If the safe harbor provision is satisfied (there exists
capital gain provisions.
a transfer of "all substantial rights" by a "holder" to an unrelated party, as
those terms are defined), then a patent transferor is assured capital gain
261
treatment.
Determinations of what constitutes a sale under general sale or
exchange principles and determinations of what constitutes a capital asset are
therefore unnecessary.

2. Tax Rules for Trademark and Trade N arne Dispositions
Another area of the law in desperate need of clarification concerned the
proper tax consequences of trademark and trade name dispositions. As
discussed earlier, there was considerable diversity of opinion among courts
over what sorts of interests retained by transferors should preclude capital gain
treatment, and there was uncertainty over the impact of contingent payments in
262
Congress added section 1253 in 1969
trademark and trade name transfers
263
to bring clarity to this area of the law.
First, section 1253 mandates ordinary income treatment for all payments
that are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of a trademark or
264
Contingent amounts received or accrued for the transfer of a
trade name.
trademark or trade name constitute ordinaq income regardless of whether the
65
transfer is in substance a sale or a license.
Second, section 1253 imposes
ordinary income treatment on noncontingent payments (whether up-front or
installment payments) received for the transfer of a trademark or trade name if
the transferor retains any significant power, right, or continuing interest with

259. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A280 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U .S.C.C.A.N. 401 7,
4422; S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 112 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747 (stating
that section 1235 can provide capital gaills treatment to all inventors, whether amateur or
professional, regardless how often they sell their patents).
260. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006). The tax treatment of a capital gam depends generally on
the property's holding period. See id. Under general characterization rules, only long-term
capital gains are accorded preferential tax treatment. See id A long-term capital gain requires a
holding period of more than one year. See id Under the special characterization provision of
section 1235, however, the actual holding period becomes irrelevant See id
261. Id. § 1235(a)-(b), (d).
262. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text
263. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 516(c)(l), 83 Stat. 487, 64 7 (1969); see
also S. REP. No. 91 -552, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2243; H. REP. No. 91-413,
reprinted in 1969U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1815-16.
264. I.R.C. § 1253(c) (2006).
265. A question left open by Congress is whether all payments received in a sale should be
treated as ordinary income with no basis recovery or whether the transferor should be permitted to
recover his or her basis. In other words, does section 1253 transform a transaction, which in form
and substance is a sale, into a license? See James 0. Tomerlin Trust v. Comm 'r, 87 T.C. 876, 892
(1986) (holding characterization of payments under section 1253 was inconclusive in determining
whether payments were royalties for purposes of the personal holding company tax because
section 1253 does not determine whether a sale has occurred).
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266

The Code sets forth six
respect to the subject matter of the mark or name.
potentially significant powers, any one of which, if retained, would require
267
ordinary income treatment.
This list of retained powers is not exhaustive;
rather, consideration is given to all the facts and circumstances existing at the
time of a transfer to determine whether an unenumerated power constitutes a
significant power. For example, the duration of the relevant restriction is
268
important in determining whether the restriction is significant.
While clarifying the tax consequences to transferors of trademarks and trade
names, Congress also, in 1969, provided a new set of tax rules for transferees
269
of such property.
Section 1253 clarified that a transferee could deduct as a
business expense contingent payments, i.e. , payments contingent on the
270
productivity, use, or disposition of the trademark or trade name transferred.
In the case of a lump sum pay ment, section 1253 provided that the transferee
could amortize the payment over the lesser of the term of the trademark
271
In 1989,
agreement if the agreement had a limited term or ten years
Congress amended section 1253. First, it provided that a transferee's
contingent payments were deductible only if the contingent amounts were paid
as part of a series of payments that were payable at least annually throughout
the term of the transfer agreement, and the ~atments were substantially equal
7
in amount or payable under a fixed formula.
Second, it limited the ten-year
amortization rule for lump sum amounts to transactions in which the lump sum
amount paid for a trademark or trade name did not exceed $1 00,000; it also
provided a new twenty-five year amortization period for fixed sum amounts
266. I.R.C. § 1253(a) (2006).
26 7. Significant retained powers, rights, and interests include: 1he right to disapprove an
assigrunent, 1he power to terminate 1he transfer at will; 1he right to prescribe standards of quality
for 1he transferee using 1he trademark; 1he right to require 1he transferee to enter an exclusive
sales agreement with 1he transferor; 1he right to require that the transferee purchase substantially
all supplies and equipment from the transferor; and 1he right to payments contingent upon 1he
productivity, use, or disposition of 1he trademark or trade name were such payments are a
substantial element of1he transfer agreement. !d. § 1253(b)(2)(A)-(F); see Consol. Foods Corp.
v. United States, 569 F.2d 436, 438 n.l (71h Cir. 1978); see also Stokely USA, Inc. v. Comm'r,
100 T.C. 439, 457 (1993); Jefferson-Pilot Corp. v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 435, 447-48 (1992), ajj'd,
995 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1993); Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. v . Comm'r, 95 T.C. 495, 515-16 (1990),
ajf'd, 12 F. 3d 1005 (101h Cir. 1993).
268. See Stokely USA Inc., 100 T.C. at 455-5 7 (finding a five-year right to disapprove a
transfer insignificant, but finding significant a twenty-year restriction preventing the transferee
from using 1he trademark on certain products).
269. I.R.C. § 1253(c)-{d) (1970).
270. !d. § 1253(d)(l) ("Amounts paid or incurred during the taxable year on account of a
transfer, sale, or oilier disposition of a franchise, trademark, or trade name which are contingent
on the productivity, use, or disposition of1he franchise, trademark, or trade name transferred shall
be allowed as a deduction under section 162(a)."). Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 516(c)(l), 83 Stat. 48 7, 647 (1969).
271. I.R.C. § 1253(d)(2) (1969). Section 1253(d)(2) provided for amortization of1he cost of a
trademark or trade name if, pursuant to section 1253(a), 1he transfer of 1he trademark was not
treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset. !d. Section 1253(a) stated that a transfer was not
treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset if 1he transferor retained any significant power,
right, or continuing interest wi1h respect to 1he su~ect matter of1he trademark or trade name. !d.
§ 1253(a) (1969).
272. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7662(a), 103 Stat.
2106,2377.
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.
$100,000. 27 3
I n 1993 , the ten-year and twenty-f.rve-year
exceedmg
amortization rules in section 1253 were eliminated with the enactment of
section 197, which provided a fifteen-year amortization rule for capitalized
274
trademark and trade name acquisition costs.
As discussed below, the
purpose of section 197 and the corresponding changes to section 1253 was to
simplify the law and minimize disputes regarding the depreciation of
.
"bles. 27 5
mtangr

3. Tax Rules for Depreciating Intellectual Property Acquisition Costs
Without doubt, Congress's greatest effort at rule simplification occurred in
1993 when Congress attempted to simplify tax depreciation rules for intangible
property. Under historic tax depreciation rules, the capitalized costs of
acquiring intellectual property could be recovered only if the intellectual
property had a limited useful life that could be determined with reasonable
2 76
accuracy
As explained earlier, there were many problems with applying
277
these traditional tax depreciation rules to intellectual property
To address
these problems and simj§lify the tax treatment of intangibles, Congress enacted,
2
in 1993, section 197
Section 197 provides a single depreciation method
(straight-line depreciation) and a single recovery period (fifteen years~ for the
2 9
capitalized costs of acquiring many forms of intellectual property.
The
fifteen-year recovery period was not based on any measure of actual usefulness
of intangibles in a business but was chosen because it was the shortest period
280
.
.
that would not have a negahve revenue 1mpact.
Section 197 provides a list of intangible property that is subject to ratable,

273. !d. § 7662(b)--{c).
274. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(c), 107 Stat.
312, 539 (Paragraph (1) of section 1253(d) remained the same allowing a current deduction for
contingent serial payments. Paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of section 1253(d) were replaced
with new paragraphs (2) and (3). New paragraph (2) provides that "[a)ny amount paid or incurred
on account of a transfer, sale, or other disposition of a ... trademark, or trade name to which
paragraph (1) does not apply shall be ... chargeable to capital account.').
275. H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 690 (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088,
1379.
276. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (2010), discussed supra notes 35-39 and accompanying
text. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993, at 1 (Comm. Print 1993) (explaining that Congress
created section 197 to eliminate considerable confusion over the federal tax treatment of
amortizable intangible assets).
277. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
278. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 416 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 197 (1993)).
279. Specifically, section 197 provides a fifteen-year depreciation deduction for the
capitalized costs of an "amortizable section 197 intangible," and prohibits any other depreciation
or amortization deduction with respect to that property. I.R.C. § 197(a)-(b) (2006). Section 197
defines an "amortizable section 197 intangible" as any "section 197 intangible" acquired after
August 10, 1993, and held in connection with a trade or business or an activity conducted for
profit. !d. § 197(c)(l). Section 197 provides a list of intangible assets that fall within the
definition of "section 197 intangible" and are subject to fifteen-year amortization. !d. § 197(d).
Section 197 also specifically excludes certain intangible assets. !d. § 197(e).
280. Beil, supra note 249, at 733-34.
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281

Specifically mentioned is "any patent, copyright,
fifteen-year depreciation.
formula, process, design, pattern, know-how, format, package design,
computer software ... or interest in a film, sound recording, video tape, book_,
. "1 ar property, " 282 as we11 as any trad emark or trade name. 28 ~
or other s1m1
Section 197 intangible property also includes goodwill, going concern value,
284
customer lists, covenants not to compete, and a few other intangibles.
Although the definition of section 197 intangibles appears broad enough to
encompass nearly all forms of intellectual property, there are several important
285
More
exceptions. Section 197 does not apply to off-the-shelf software.
importantly, though, section 197 does not apply to any interest in a patent,
patent application, copyright, or com~uter software that is not acquired as part
86
ofa purchase ofa trade or business.
Trade secrets, know -how, trademarks,
and trade names are not included within the exception for separately acquired
287
assets.
Thus, these forms of intellectual property are subject to fifteen-year
amortization under section 197 regardless of whether they were acquired as
288
part of a trade or business or separately.
Interestingly, Congress has chosen different tax depreciation rules for
intellectual property excluded from section 197' s scope-separately acquired
patents, separately acquired copyrights, separately acquired software, and off
289
the-shelf software.
For patents and copyrights acquired outside the context of a business
acquisition, tax depreciation rules applicable prior to 1993 generally continue
290
Thus, the capitalized costs of separately acquired patents and
to apply.
copyrights are recovered under one of two approaches: (1) over their useful
lives under the straight-line method or (2) as income is earned under the
291
income forecast method.
In 1997, Congress codified the income forecast
method of depreciation in section 167(g) of the Code, providin~ a maximum
92
recovery period of eleven years for income forecast property.
In 2004,

281. I.R.C. § 197(d).
282. Id. § 197(d)(l)(c)(iii); Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-2(b)(5) (2010).
283. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(F); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(10) (2010).
284. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l).
285. Id. § 197(e)(3)(A). This exception applies to software (whether acquired as part of a
trade or business or otherwise) that is readily available for purchase by the general public, is
subjectto a non-exclusive license, and that has not been substantially modified. Id
286. Id. § 197(e)(3)(A)(ii), (e)(4); Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-2(c)(7) (2010).
287. Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-14(a) (2010).
288. I.R.C. § 197(a).
289. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-14(a)-(b) (2010); Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 757 (2003).
290. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(a) (providing that "intangibles excluded from section 197 are
amortizable only if they qualifY as property subject to the allowance for depreciation under
section 167(a)').
291. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
292. I.R.C. § 167(g); see also the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, § 1604, 110 Stat. 1755, 1836. Forecasted total income includes all income the taxpayer
reasonably believes will be earned during the eleven-year period beginning with the year the
property is placed in service. § 167(g)(l)(A), (g)(5)(C). In the eleventh year, a taxpayer may
deduct any unrecovered costs left in the property. § 167(g)(l)(C).
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Congress amended section 167(g), limiting the types of property for which the
293
In 2005, Congress again amended
income forecast method may be used.
294
section 167(g) to provide a special rule for applicable musical property.
Although now expired, the provision permitted a taxpayer to elect to ratably
deduct the costs of acquiring any musical composition or any copyright with
respect to musical composition Rroperty over a five-year period instead of
. th e mcome
.
"~orecast meth od.295
usmg
For off-the-shelf software and software acquired outside the context of a
business acquisition, Congress created new cost recovery rules. Under section
167(f), which was added to the Code in 1993 along with section 197, such
296
software is to be depreciated over 36 months using the straight-line method.
The justification for carving out a short three-year recovery period for readily
available software and separately acquired software was that computer
software differs significantly from other forms of intangibles in that its value is
297
A lengthy fifteen-year
ascertainable and it has a measurable useful life.
amortization period would bear no resemblance to the actual useful life of
298
software
and would exact a penalty on those U.S. companies extensively
299
In 2003, Congress added off
using computer software in their operations.
293. I.R.C. § 167(g)(6), amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108
357, § 2, 118 Stat 1418. Eligible property is specifically limited to interests (including interests
involving limited rights) in the following property: (1) motion picture films, video tapes, and
sound recordings ; (2) copyrights; (3) books; ( 4) patents; (5) theatrical productions; and (6) other
property as designated in published guidance by the Service. § 167(g)(6). The income forecast
method is appropriate for these types of property because they possess unique income earning
characteristics. For instance, the income potential of a purchased film varies as a direct result of
the film's popularity; its economic usefulness cannot be measured adequately by the property' s
physical condition or by the passage of time. See Guidance Cost Recovery Under the Income
Forecast Method, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(explaining why the income forecast method is appropriate for properties specified in section
167(g)).
294. I.R.C. § 167(g)(8)(A), as added by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act
of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 207, 120 Stat. 345, 350.
295. An election may not be made for any tax year beginning after December 31, 2010.
I.R.C. § 167(g)(8)(E). The special five-year option applied to capitalized expenditures paid or
incurred by music publishers, performers, producers, and recording companies who acquired any
applicable musical property (as well as to capitalized expenditures paid or incurred by
songwriters and composers who created any applicable musical property). !d. § 167(g)(8)(A),
(C).
296. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 107 Stat.
312, 538. See H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 680 (1993) (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1369. For purposes of section 167(f), computer software is defined as "any
program designed to cause a computer to perform a desired fimction." I.R.C. §§ 167(f)(l)(B),
197(e)(3XB). The term does not include "any data base or similar item unless the data base or
item is in the public domain and is incidental to the operation of otherwise qualifYing computer
software." Id
297. Tax Treatment ofIntangible Assets: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong.
148 (1992) (statement of the Coalition for Fair Treatment oflntangibles) [hereinafter Statement
of Coalition].
298. !d. at 36 (statement of William P. Benac, Treasurer, Electronic Data Systems). For
example, Microsoft's word processing program "Word," which was introduced in 1983, saw four
new versions and three major upgrades in the ten years subsequent to release. !d. at 51.
299. The fifteen-year amortization period under section 197 would impede the ability of the
United States information technologies to compete in world markets because it would effectively
raise the cost of acquiring computer software by ten to fifteen percent. Id at 36. Many of the
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the-shelf computer software to the list of tangible property eligible to be
300
expensed immediately under section 179.
As a result, the cost of
purchasing off-the-shelf software can be immediately deducted rather than
. 1"1zed and amortlze
. d overthree years. 301
cap1ta
With these enactments, Congress dramatically changed the depreciation
rules for acquired intellectual property. Congress provided an arbitrary fifteen
year recovery period for intellectual property acquired in the context of a
302
And
business acquisition, regardless of the intellectual property's legal life.
it carved out a special three-year rule for certain computer software-off-the
303
shelf software and separately acquired software.
Although Congress left
the law as it was for several other forms of intangible assets, permitting them
to be recovered over their useful lives under the straight-line method or over a
maximum of eleven years under the income forecast method (e.g., separately
acquired patents and separately acquired copyrights), these legislative
enactments reflect a bold attempt to provide a uniform predictable set of tax
304
rules for depreciating costs of intellectual property
V. TilE CURRENT TAX CODE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A
HARMONIOUS EXISTENCE?

The United States has witnessed profound technological changes from the
Industrial Revolution period to the Digital Age. The Industrial Revolution
arrived in the United States and ~ave birth to subsequent eras wherein
05
306
electricity switched nights to days,
machines re~laced manual labor,
3 7
and rails connected
telephones replaced face-to-face communications,

competing computer software nations already had tax policies in place allowing for computer
software to be amortized over either a three or five year period. Id at 36-37. Ultimately, a
fifteen year amortization period would discourage software investment and impair international
competitiveness. Statement of Coalition, supra note 297, at 148.
300. Since 1981, the government has permitted business taxpayers to elect to deduct
immediately the cost of purchasing section 179 property. Section 179 property is generally
tangible, depreciable, personal property-as opposed to real property-that is acquired for use in
the active conduct of a trade or business. I.R.C. § 179(d)(l). Off-the-shelf software was added to
the list of qualifYing property by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003.
Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 757 (2003).
301. Only off-the-shelf software purchased in a tax year beginning after 2002 and before 2012
qualifies for the special deduction under section 179. I.R.C. § 179(d)(l)(A).
302. Beil, supra note 249, at 733-34.
303. I.R.C. § 167(a)(l)(A), (g)(1)(c), (g)(5)(c).
304. See id § 167(g)( 1)(A).
305. Thomas Edison invented the phonograph and incandescent light bulb in 1877 and 1879,
respectively.
See
The
Inventions
of
Thomas
Edison,
ABouT.COM,
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventorslb/edison htm Oast visited Oct. 18, 2010).
306. Elias Howe inv ented and patented the sewing machine in 1846, and Isaac Singer
improved and marketed Howe's sewing machine in 1851. See Elias Howe was the inventor ofthe
first
American-patented
sewing
machine,
ABOUT.COM,
http://inventors.about.com/od/hstartinventors/a/Elias _Howe htm Oast visited Nov. 6, 201 0).
307. Alexander Gral!am Bell invented the telephone in 1876. See Alexander Grahcon Bell
Biography, ABOUT.COM, http ://inventors.about.com/library/inv entorslbitelephone2.htm Oast
visited Nov. 6, 2010).
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The rapid changes
people, shortened distances, and shrank durations.
continued in the Digital/ Information Age when most analog machines and
mechanical devices were replaced by better, faster, and more capable digital
309
Data and information in every field are now collected, stored,
devices.
310
Telecommunication
dissected, analyzed, combined, and accessed digitally
is wireless, replacinft the slow and costly landline telephones and connecting
3
The Internet and its profound impact alter the ways
people worldwide.
humans communicate, function, connect, work, educate, and entertain
312
together.
The biotech industry has blossomed and flourished rapidly in the last couple
313
of decades.
Genetic engineering feeds billions with revolutionary
314
Gene
approaches to farming and affects global populations' quality of life

308. For an accmmt of the rapid changes in the United States during the Industrial Age, see
generally JULIE HUSBAND & JIM O' LOUGHLIN, DAILY LIFE IN TilE INDUSTRIAL UNITED STATES,
1870--1900, at back cover (Greenwood Press 2004) ("Daily life in the Industrial age was ever
changing, unsettling, outright dangerous, and often thrilling. Electric power turned night into
day, cities swelled with immigrants from the countryside and from Europe, and great fuctories
belched smoke and beat unnatural rhythms while turning out consumer goods at an astonishing
pace. Distance and time condensed as rail travel and telegraph lines tied the vast United States
together as never before.").
309. See Mathew Goodman, Digital Age Ushers in Epic Cinema Changes, SUNDAY TIMES,
July
30,
2006,
at
11,
available
at
http:/!business.timesonline. co.ukltol!business/industry_sectors/medialarticle 10841 05 .ece.
Goodman noted that:
Traditional analogue equipment is able only to project reels of film on
to the big screen. But digital projectors open up a range of new possibilities.
For instance, they allow exhibitors to provide video games or broadcast live
events, such as football matches or pop concerts. They could even be used
by companies for sales demonstrations or lectures.
They also allow cinemas to become more flexible with the films they
show. A piece of celluloid for an analogue projector is heavy, unwieldy and
expensive to produce. Digital films are much easier, like changing a
cartridge on a video-games [sic] console, and a fraction of the cost to
produce. For a chain such as Cineworld, which prides itself on screening
films tailored to its local customer base, such as showing Bollywood movies
in areas with large Indian populations, it will make life much easier.
310. See generally Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Collateralizing Privacy, 78 TuL. L. REv. 553
(2004) (discussing how data is collected, used, and abused).
311. See, e.g, Michael L. Best, The Wireless Revolution and Universal Access, in TRENDS IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 2003, at 107 (John Alden ed., 2003), available at
http://cyber.law harvard. eduldigitaldem ocracy!best-wirelessrevolution-sept03.
312. See generally Nguyen & Maine, supra note 39; Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us
Stupid?,
THE
ATLANTIC,
July-Aug.
2008,
at
56,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/ 200807/google (discussing the impact of Google search and the
Net as the universal medium for instant information); Jeff Goldsmith, How Will The Internet
Change Our Health System?, HEALTII AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 148, available at
http:/lhealthaffhighwire.org/cgi/reprint/19/ 11148. Conferences on online teaching with focuses
on challenges and opportunities are frequent where administrators and educators convene to share
See
ONLINE
TEACHING
CONFERENCE
2010,
their
expertise.
http://onlineteachingconference.org/presentations html (last visited Oct. 18, 201 0).
313. See PeterS. Goodman, In NC., A Second Industrial Revolution, WASH. PoST, Sept. 3,
2007, at A01, (reporting on how the biotechnology and technology industries have transformed
North Carolina and the United States).
314. See, e.g, BRYAN BERGERON & PAUL CHAN, BIOTECH INDUSTRY: A GLOBAL,
EcONOMIC, AND FINANCING OVERVIEW 22 (2004) (asserting that the biotech industry has

6 / 14 /2011 8:37AM

NGUYENMAINE W KG

20 11]

The History ofIntellectual Property Taxation

151
315

research has led to new understanding of diseases and cures.
.
hno1og1es
. are unrave1'mg th e unknown m
. cancers. 316 New drugs are
Bwtec
31 7
invented to alter the cause of death.
In the last forty years, intellectual property assets have risen meteorically,
ascending in scale in corporate value and importance. In the decades before
the Digital Age, companies such as Boeing, AT&T, GE, IBM, Texas
Instruments, Microsoft, and Apple rose to domination with their products and
services that were covered by patents, copyrights trade secrets, and trademarks
318
Many of these companies
that changed the way of business and daily life.
and their founders became household names, replacing Alexander Graham
319
Bell, Thomas Edison, and John Singer.
The Digital Age arrived and forced companies to change, adapt, or perish.
Those that adapted and continued to innovate had a chance to survive. Others
faded. One thing is certain: intellectual property continues to serve as an
important asset to corporate competition and growth. For example, Texas
Instruments and IBM changed their core businesses, moved away from
manufacturing products, and embraced a licensing model that allowed them to
320
Apple
capitalize on their strengths based on powerful patent portfolios.
impacted the "quality oflife on a global scale").
315. Research Breakthrough Targets Genetic Diseases, MEDICAL NEws TODAY (Jan. 20,
2009), http://www medicalnewstoday.com/articles/ 136010.php (reporting on genetic research
breakthroughs). For latest information in gene research, biology and medicine news and
technology, see About Us, Bra-MEDICINE, http ://www.bio-medicine.org/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2010) (online web portals devoted to biology and medicine, posting the breaking news about the
latest discoveries and research projects in the fields).
316. See Gordon McVie, What Does the Biotech Revolution Mean?, THE GuARDlAN (Mar. 9,
2003, 9:34AM), http ://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2003 /mar/09/health.lifeandhealth1 (focusing
on how the biotech revolution would impact cancer research and treatment).
31 7. For latest reports on new drug breakthroughs, see Pharmaceutical News and Articles,
DRUGS.COM, http ://www.drugs.com/ news.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
318. The GE trademark alone was valued at $43 billion in 2001 , and the IBM trademark was
valued at $52 billion. IBM leads all companies in seeking and obtaining the most patents issued
by the United States Patent Office for its ever-expanding patent portfolio. See Brad Stone,
Nickels, Dimes, Billions: Big Tech Companies are Raking in Big Bucks~A Little at a Time--By
Use
of Their
Innovations,
NEWSWEEK
(Aug.
2,
2004),
Charging for
http://newsweek. com /2004/08/0 1/nickels-dimes-billions .html#.
319. When Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, stepped down there was an outpour of
articles about the event. See, e.g., It's Official: The lvficrosoft 2.0 Era ms Begun, MICROSOFr 2.0
(June 29, 2008 6:22 PM), http://www microsoft2 net/2008/06/29/its-official-the-microsoft-20
era-has-begun/ (listing links to articles about Bill Gates leaving Microsoft after 33 years from The
Economist, ABC News, National Public Radio, Investor's Business Daily, Gizmodo, Wired, and
Reuters). With respect to Steve Jobs of Apple, the public and investors' obsession with his health
are routinely reported in the media. See, e.g., Henry Blodget, Time For Apple to Finally Level
with Investors About Steve Jobs' Health and Future Role, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 28, 2009,
10:06 AM), http :1/ www. businessinsider. com/henry-blodget-time-for-apple-to-finally-level-with
investors-about-steve-jobs-health-2009-6; Joe Nocera, Steve Jobs andApple: Here We Go Again,
N.Y.
TlMES
(June
23,
2009;
12:56
PM),
http:/I executivesuite. blogs nytim es .com/ 2009/06/23 /steve-j obs-and-apple-here-we-go-again/;
Daniel Lyons, Why We Need Steve Jobs: Love Him or Hate Him, Apple Needs Its CEO Back
Now., NEWSWEEK (June 23, 2009), http://www newsweek.com/2009/06/22/why-we-need-steve
jobs html.
320. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REv.
775, 787-90 (2008) (discussing the drastic change in business approach through aggressive patent
licensing by TI and IBM); see also Stone, supra note 318. Stone notes:
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changed its image of a desktop company to become an ultra-chic company
with sleek products and accessones rangmg from computing to
321
telecommunications to entertainment.
Anchoring Apple are the brand
name, the trade secrets, the patents, the copyrights, and the software; they
constitute the driving force for the creation, production, and distribution of
322
Apple company products.
In another example, Microsoft is no longer the global company with the
omnipresence that it once had in the 1980s and early 1990s; Google has
323
become the ubiquitous company globally
What does it own? Google is
powerful because of its search engine technology, which competes fiercely
324
against and eliminates others in the web search industry.
Google's search

IBM set the standard for patent licensing in the early '90s. While Big Blue
was in a steep decline, veteran employee and lawyer Marshall Phelps got the
company to raise the fees it charged others for piggybacking on its
ubiquitous technology. Phelps recalls that incoming CEO Lou Gerstner was
skeptical of the program; at RJR Nabisco, he had been involved in a patent
dispute with Procter & Gamble over soft chocolate-chip cookies. Phelps
changed Gerstner's mind by cracking open an IBM PC and showing him all
the components that came from other companies. In other words: hardware
companies were interdependent, and as the biggest fish in the sea, IBM
should exploit that fact. A few years []later[,] IBM was raking in $2 billion
a year of almost pure profit from licensing revenue.

Id
321. Apple' s products are often described as "cool" and "chic" by many. See John Delavan,
Embrace Your Inner Ceek, LEGAL MGMT., July-Aug. 2007, at 4, 4 ("[M]y partner and I
embarked on a long-planned mission to upgrade our home-computing situation, replacing an
antiquated Apple iMac (one of those cool-looking but gigantic blue-shell machines with a handle)
with a spiffY ne~ MacBook laptop."); John Delavan, Money Talks, LEGAL MGMT., Sept.-Oct.
2007, at 4, 4 ( CEO Steve Jobs armounced the release of a bunch of cool new products,
including iPod nanos that play video and the iPod touch, a nifty device that does everything the
popular iPhone does except make phone calls."); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Browser
Browsing, Ocr. CHI. B. Ass'N REc., Oct. 2008, at 58, 58 ("My immediate reaction to the
interface on Apple' s Safari for Windows was, 'Cool, I am dabbling in Mac.' It feels a little like a
[sic] being a college kid the first time you go into a jazz club.").
322. As intellectual property assets are important to its corporate dominance, Apple is
aggressive in protecting its intellectual property rights. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No.
1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *7-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (ordering an ISP to
disclose identities oflntemet users accused of misappropriating Apple trade secrets),vacated, 44
Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F. 3d
1435, 1446--47 (9th Cir. 1994) (copyright infringement and other claims); Apple Inc. v. Psystar
Corp., No. C 08-03251, 2009 WL 303046, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009) (software and copyright
infringement claims); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Podfitness, Inc., No. 06-5805, 2007 WL 1378020,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2007) (trademark infringement and unfair competition claims); Victoria
A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment, 49 IDEA
359, 404-05 (2009) (discussing how Apple sued to get the identity of the source for the trade
secret disclosure).
323. See Rob Hof, Is Coogle Too Poweiful?, Bus. WEEK (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/conten1!07_15/b4029001 htm?chan=gl (noting Google's
global dominance in multiple industries and noting that Google's tactics and domination "might
sound crazy given that we're talking about a nine-year-old company that wasn't even publicly
traded until Aug. 19, 2004").
324. Id (Google' s search engine is "the No. 1 gateway to the Net' s vast commercial potential.
With more data on what people are searching for, Google can serve up the most targeted and
relevant advertisements alongside the results, drawing more clicks, more cash, more users-you
get the idea."); see Miguel Helft, Coogle Jvfakes a Case That It Isn't So Big, N.Y. TlMES, June 28,
2009, at Bl. ("Google handles roughly two-thirds of all Internet searches" and "owns the largest
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engine technolo:fl¥ is proprietary and protected by trade secrets, software law,
and patent law.
Google has a vast database of information that is vital to its
326 G
.
. not m
. a bm·1d·mg; 1t
. 1s
. m
. a " c1oud ." 32 7
oog1e ' s vast content 1s
busmess.
The name "Google" is not just the dictionary name "google" but a global brand
with a value estimated at approximately $25.59 billion, climbing from the rank
328
of 20th to 1Oth global brand between 2007 and 2008.
With these dynamic and profound technolofical changes, intellectual
29
property has become a core corporate asset.
Reflective of these
online video site, YouTube." Last year Google "sold nearly $22 billion in advertising, more than
any media company in the world.").
325. See Tenns of Service, GooGLE, http ://www.google.com/cse/ docs/cse/tos htrnl (last
visited Oct. 22, 2010) (detailing Google's intellectual property and other rights and prohibiting
users from violating Google's proprietary rights); Google's Opposition to the Government' s
Motion to Compel at 1, Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 5:06-mc
80006-JW), at 2006 WL 543697 (detailing Google's search engine technology and proprietary
data protected under trade secret law).
326. Google's Opposition to the Government's Motion to Compel, supra note 325; see also
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Microsoft Lawyer to Blast Google, RED HERRING (Mar. 5, 2007, 10:00
PM), http://www redherring.com/ Home/ 21533 (reporting on Google's Book Search content and
the allegations asserted by publishers against Google in copyright infringement suit); Janet
Morrissey, Librarians Fighting Google 's Book Deal, TlME (June 17, 2009),
www.timecom/tim/printou1!0,8816,1904495,00.htrnl (reporting the Google Book content deal and
the potential problems associated from the deal due to the vast size of the book content and
Google's control).
32 7. Elizabeth Montalbano, Microsoft Criticizes Drafting of Secret "Cloud Manifesto
CIO.coM (Mar. 26, 2009), http ://www.cio.com/article/print486930/ (noting that Google is a big
cloud proponent "with its Web-hosted products like the Apps collaboration suite and the App
Engine development platform" while "Microsoft so far has neither been a thought nor a
technology leader in cloud computing"); see also Stephen Baker, Google and the Wisdom of
Clouds,
Bus.
WEEK
(Dec.
13,
2007,
5:00
PM),
http ://www. busines sweek. com/magazine/conten1!07_52/b4064048925 83 6 htrn. Baker notes:
What is Google's cloud? It's a network made of hundreds of thousands, or
by some estimates 1 million, cheap servers, each not much more powerful
than the PCs we have in our homes. It stores staggering amounts of data,
including numerous copies of the World Wide Web. This makes search
faster, helping ferret out answers to billions of queries in a fraction of a
second. U nlike many traditional supercomputers, Google's system never
ages. When its individual pieces die, usually after about three years,
engineers pluck them out and replace them with new, faster boxes. This
means the cloud regenerates as it grows, almost like a living thing. A move
towards clouds signals a fimdamental shift in how we handle information.
At the most basic level, it's the computing equivalent of the evolution in
electricity a century ago when farms and businesses shut down their own
generators and bought power instead from efficient industrial utilities.
Baker, supra.
328. See
Best
Global
Brands
2008,
Bus.
WEEK,
http ://www.businessweek.com /interactive_reports/ global_brand_2008 htrnl (last visited Feb. 17,
2011) [hereinafter Global Brands] (reporting on Google as a global brand name).
329. In the biotech industry, for example, the patentable subject matter of a man-made
organism marked the beginning and growth of intellectual property assets and the biotech
industry
itself.
See
Intellectual
Property,
BroMELBOURNE
NETWORK,
http ://www.bio melbourne.org/ content_]lages /display/89 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) ("The
biotechnology industry as we know it did not exist prior to the landmark Supreme Court decision
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty of 1980. . . The patent system fosters the development of new
biotechnology products and discoveries, new uses for old products and employment opportunities
for [millions of Americans). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the biotechnology arena.
Patents add value to laboratory discoveries, providing incentives for private sector investment
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technological advancements and the rise of intellectual property as valuable
330
assets is the growth of intellectual property law in the United States.
331
Empowered by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution,
Congress passed the
original ~atent and copyright statutes in April 1790 in the first congressional
3 2
As a result of subsequent case law development and statutory
session.
amendments through the years, patent, copyright trademark, and trade secret
333
laws are now well-developed in the United States.
While the body of intellectual property laws developed rapidly beginning at
the inception of the nation, income tax laws governing intellectual property
334
were slow to evolve.
Indeed, until the mid-twentieth century, the resolution
of tax issues regarding intellectual property involved the use of existing,
traditional principles of taxation equally applicable to tangible property.
Specific tax rules governing intellectual property transactions developed
into biotechnology development of new medicines and diagnostics for treatment and monitoring
of intractable diseases, and agricultural and environmental products, to meet global needs.").
Intellectual property as core corporate assets can be seen through a brief review ofbrand names
across the globe today and the billions of dollars each brand commands and the goods with which
each brand is associated: Coca-Cola for beverages (valued at $70.45 billion); IBM for computer
services (valued at $64. 73 billion); GE for a wide range of industries from household appliances
and heavy equipment to financing (valued at $42.81 billion). See Global Brands, supra note 328.
330. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for
Economic Policy Research Economic Summit (Feb. 27, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/) ("[I]n recent decades, as
the economic product of the United States has become so predominantly conceptual, [so] have
issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant .
.");Merrill Matthews, Jr. & Tom Giovanetti, Why Intellectual Property Is Important, IDEAS (Inst.
for Policy Innovation, Lewisville, Tex), July 8, 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.ipi. org/IPI%5 CIPIPublications .nsf/PublicationLookupFullTextPDF/94061686270E14
F286256C3800514943/$File/II-CaseForiP-2.pdf?OpenElement (stating tlmt fue United States has
become the powerhouse of intellectual property as the economy has shifted from an industrial- to
an information-based economy and a new creative class of workforce has replaced other groups
of workers).
331. The Constitution offue United States provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Aufuors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to fueir respective Writings and Discoveries; ..."U.S. CoNST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
332. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
333. The patent statutes went through major revisions in 1952. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (noting fue re-codification of patent statutes in 1952 and what Congress
revised in that year); Gral!am v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6-17 (1966)
(discussing the Patent Act of 1952, noting fue history of patent law in the early days when
Thomas Jefferson was the Commissioner of the Patent Office, and fue evolution of patent law,
particularly on issues such as non-obviousness). Copyright law witnessed two major revisions:
the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub.
L. No. b0-849, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
§ 102, 90 Stat 2541, 2598 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2009)); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 47-49 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing changes and
legislative history of copyright statutes). With respect to trademark law, a substantial revision
occurred in 1946 wifu the passage of the Lanham Act on trademarks and unfair competition. See
BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1-3 (1994)
(tracking fue development oftrademark law through history up to fue codification of the common
law in the Lanham Act). The model trade secret law or fue Uniform Trade Secrets Act was
promulgated in 1979. See DavidS. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets
Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 772 (2009) (providing a history of
trade secret law).
334. See Sz.qJra Part IV.
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slowly and separately from the body of law governing intellectual property
335
These tax rules were designed primarily to resolve the procedural
rights.
dissonance that occurred when general princ~les of taxation were used to
6
resolve early intellectual property tax disputes.
Much of that dissonance in
the intersection of intellectual property and taxation has been detected and
addressed. But the ad hoc development of special tax rules created primarily
with tax goals in mind resulted in a tax system that does not ideally support the
intellectual property system and modern trends, such as the current business
practice of integration and bundling of different types of intellectual property.
A. SUPPORTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY'S INNOVATION GOALS

The policy goals of intellectual property law often emphasize two mam
principles: innovation and efficiency. Patent and copyright laws, in general,
motivate innovation and creative activities of inventors and authors and induce
337
the "release to the public of the products of [their] creative genius."
Innovation is the cornerstone anchoring the growth and advancement of the
338
Trade secret protection embodies the policy goal of
United States
innovation in addition to achieving efficiency through reduction of business
339
Trademark law
misconduct relating to trade secret misappropriation.
centers on the facilitation of efficiency in the marketplace for both consumers
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 41 7, 429 (1984) (Copyright
monopoly privileges "are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision
of a special reward."); United States v . Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.
It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of
his creative genius."); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 288--89
(1970) (examining the "property" right in copyrights and how the reward of''property" is "often
created for reasons of efficiency').
338. See United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 332 (1948) ("As interpreter ofthe
Congressional Acts that have expressed the patent policy of this nation since its beginning, this
Court is entrusted with the protection of that policy against intrusions upon it. The crucial
importance ofthe development of inventions and discoveries is not limited to this nation. As the
population of the world has increased, its geographical frontiers have shrunk. However, the
frontiers of science have expanded until civilization now depends largely upon discoveries on
those frontiers to meet the infinite needs of the future. The United States, thus fur, has taken a
leading part in making those discoveries and in putting them to use.").
339. The Supreme Court has long recognized that with respect to innovations not eligible for
patent protection: "Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not
reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation
of his invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if
not quite patentable, invention." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974);
see a/so RESTATEMENT (TH1RD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITlON § 39 cmt. a (1995) ("[T)he protection
of trade secrets has been justified as a means to encourage investment in research by providing an
opportunity to capture the returns from successful innovations.'); Katarzyna A. Czapracka,
Antitmst and Trade Secrets: The US. and the EU Approach, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TEcH. L.J. 207, 212 (2008) ("Consequently, trade secret protection involves the same
fundamental policy choices between favoring innovation and favoring competition as laws
protecting other forms ofiP.').
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and producers of trademarked products or services.
The current tax regime governing intellectual property does not ideally
support desirable intellectual property incentives and efficiencies. Several
current tax rules reflect a polic'{ decision to incentivize developments of
34
patents and patent-like property.
But these tax benefits are circumscribed in
ways that undermine their utility. For example, the section 174 deduction for
research and development expenditures applies to those inventors who use or
342
intend to use their research results in a trade or business.
The deduction
arguably does not apply to an inventor who merely intends to license the
results of her inventive activities for taxable income, although a few courts
have found a trade or business of inventing and thus permitted current
343
deductions.
This requirement fails to recognize that, in today's
innovation marketplace, very few individual inventors, startup
compames, and young research entities develop their
innovations into end products or services for commercial
exploitation in a trade or business, but rather intend to sell or
license their innovations to larger companies looking to
acquire innovations to supplement their own research or build
. . mte
. 11ectua1property portlo
.. 1.10s. 344
prom1smg
Like the section 174 deduction (enacted in 1954), the section 41 research
credit (enacted in 1981) was designed to encourage additional research and
345
development.
As structured, however, the credit fails to achieve optimal
technology outcomes. First, the credit's reformulation over the years has
346
limited the types of research for which the credit is available.
Second, the
incremental nature of the credit means many businesses cannot make use of
any of the credit, placing U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage as
compared to international firms entitled to greater tax incentives in their
347
Third, the temporary nature of the credit
countries for research spending.
340. See Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle Des Etrangers a
Monaco, 329 F. 3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the very real interest that our trademark
laws have in minimizing consumer confusion" is to ensure "that our economy may enjoy the
greatest possible of efficiencies"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) ("fhe overall conclusion is that
trademark law . . . can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote
economic efficiency'); see also Berner Int'l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3rd Cir.
1993) (commenting that "[t]rademark protection is desirable because of the efficiencies and
incentives produced by symbolic affiliation ofproducer and quality product').
341. See I.R.C. § 41 (2006) (providing a credit for certain research and development
expenditures); id. § 174 (providing a deduction for certain research and development
expenditures); id. § 1235 (providing preferential capital gain treatment for certain patent
transfers). For a discussion of these tax incentives, see supra notes 194-202 and accompanying
text.
342. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 2, at 28-29.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 29.
345. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
346. Not all expenditures that qualifY for the research deduction under section 174 qualifY for
the research credit under section 41 due to special regulatory requirements and exceptions.
347. The credit applies only to qualified research expenditures in excess of a base amount that
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makes it difficult for firms to plan research activities.
The current tax incentives for patents and patent-like property do not apply
to other forms of valuable intellectual property, such as copyrightable property
348
and trademarks.
As a ¥eneral rule, copyright and trademark development
49
Limited exceptions have been carved out but
costs must be capitalized.
arguably do not go far enough to achieve optimal copyright and trademark
350
goals.
With respect to copyright activ ities, a special exception in the Code permits
freelance writers, photographers, and authors to deduct "qualified creative
351
But the exception is
expenses" that would otherwise have to be capitalized.
overly restrictive. First, the exception is not so broad as to include all
individuals engaged in any creative activity. Rather it is limited to only certain
individuals-writers, photographers, and artists-as those terms are defined in
352
Tax benefits for patent inventors are not so restrictive; both
the Code.
individual and corporate inventors are eligible to deduct costs of developing or
353
Second, the exception for
improving a product, which is broadly defined.
freelance writers, photographers, and authors is limited only to individuals
whose activities rise to the level of a trade or business within the meaning of
354
the Code.
For example, an author may currently deduct the costs of writing
a book but only if the author has already established himself in the trade or
business of writing. This is not a requirement for patent inventors; they only
need to show that they have the intent and capability to enter a business with
355
Further, although an author may deduct the costs
the resulting technology.
is a "fixed-base percentage" of the taxpayer's average annual gross receipts for the four preceding
tax years. I.R.C. § 41(a), (c)(l). For established finns, the fixed-base percentage is generally
based on a ratio of the taxpayer's qualified research expenses to its gross receipts for years 1984
to 1988, capped at 16%. Id § 41(c)(3)(A). Calculating today's credit based on research spending
relative to receipts in the years 1984-1988 does not reflect the realities oftoday's economic and
technological world and could penalize a company that had high research spending levels during
the 1984-1988 base period.
348. See, e.g, id § 1235.
349. Id §§ 263, 263A; Treas. Reg. § 1.263-4 (2006).
350. See, e.g, I.R.C. § 263A(h).
351. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
352. A "writer" is defined as an individual whose personal efforts create, or may be expected
to create, a literary manuscript, musical composition, or dance score. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(3)(A). A
"photographer" is defined as an individual whose personal efforts create, or are expected to
create, a photograph, a photographic negative, or transparency. Id § 263A(h)(3)(B). An "artist"
is an individual whose personal efforts create, or are expected to create, a picture, painting,
sculpture, statue, etching, dmwing, cartoon, graphic design, or original print edition. Id §
263A(h)(3)(C).
353. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 74-2(a).
354. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(2)(A).
355. For research and development costs to be deductible under section 174, they must be
incurred "in connection with" the taxpayer's trade or business. Id § 174. Prior to 1974, the
Service and the courts took the position that in order to qualify for section 174 treatment, a
taxpayer must have already engaged in a trade or business. Snow v. Comm 'r, 482 F.2d 1029,
1031-32 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U .S. 500 (1974). However, the Supreme Court rejected this
narrow approach and held that pre-operational research or experimental expenditures could
qualify for the section 174 deduction. 416 U.S. 500. Although a taxpayer need not be currently
conducting a business, the taxpayer must, however, dernonstrate a realistic prospect of entering
into a trade or business that will exploit the technology under development. See, e.g, Kantor v.
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of writing a book, the author cannot immediately deduct the attorney's fees or
fees paid to any government agency to obtain copyright protections on the
356
Again, these rules for attorney's and government fees
developed product.
do not apply to patent inventors; the tax law is very clear that all costs incident
to the development of a patent are deductible, including attorney's fees in the
. of a patent app1"1cat10n.
. 357
prosecutwn
Tax rules with respect to trademarks are quite unfavorable as compared to
tax rules governin? patents and arguably are in disharmony with trademark
35
Although the advertising costs of building up the goodwill
goals in general.
value in trademarks are currently deductible even though such costs provide
benefits of a long-term nature, most other trademark costs are not and must be
359
capitalized.
For example, the fees paid to a government agency to obtain
360
In addition, legal fees incurred
trademark protections must be capitalized.
361
in trademark infringement actions generally must be capitalized.
B. SUPPORTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHANGES

Special tax rules applicable to intellectual property reference and define
362
For example, section 1235 of the
specific types of intellectual property.
Code applies only to "patents" as defined in the Treasury Regulations under
.
1253 app 1"1es to "
demark"
.
1235 , 363 sect10n
sectwn
tra
s an d" trade names, " as
364
and section 197 applies to an enumerated list of
defined for tax purposes,
intangible intellectual property assets, each of which is defined for tax
. th e Treasury Regu 1atlons.
.
36~
purposes m
One problem with this asset-specific approach is that the resulting tax
regime governing intellectual property is not equipped to deal with emerging
intangible intellectual property rights. For example, specific tax rules do not
exist for domain names, valuable assets that emer~ed with the arrival of global
66
Are domain names mere
electronic commerce transactions on the internet.
Comm ' r, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993). In making this determination, the taxpayer must
demonstrate both an oQjective intent to enter into the trade or business or the capability to do so.
Id
356. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
357. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 74-2(a)(l).
358. Id § 1.197-2(a)(l), (b)(lO), (c)(7).
359. Id § 1.197-2(a)(l), (b)(lO), (c)(7), (k).
360. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g, Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980).
363. Id
364. These terms were broadly defined in regulations that were proposed in 1971 but
eventually withdrawn due to a sunset provision. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-1, -3, 36 Fed. Reg.
13, 148 (July 15, 197 1), withdrawn by 58 Fed. Reg. 25,587 (Apr. 27, 1993). The term
"trademark" for purposes of section 1253 was defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identity his goods
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." Id § 1.1253-2(b), 36 Fed. Reg.
13,151 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
365. Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-2(b).
366. See Genevieve Bergeron & Rea Hawi, Dot-Ca Domain Name Dispute Resolution:
Where Do We Stand Five Years after Implementation of the CIRA Policy, 21 lNTELL. PRoP. J.
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variations of traditional forms of intellectual property, to which the existing tax
regime can be applied? It could be argued that domain names that function as
"source identifiers should be treated under the current tax regime applicable to
trademarks" but that generic domain names are not dealt with by the existing
367
This is troublesome in light of the valuable nature of generic
tax regime.
domain names. Generic domain names are easy to remember-a generic or
368
The names specifY or describe the products
descriptive URL of a website.
369
or services offered at the website.
For example, www.loans.com is a URL
for the online lending and banking services; it was purchased by Bank of
370
America for $3 million.
Such names are generally not protected under
371
Providing these names protection
trademark laws because they are generic.
372
would render everyone else speechless and perpetuate anti-competiv eness.
Though there is no trademark protection for these ?eneric names, they are
37
Indeed, in the early e
valuable as domain names or URLs for a website.
commerce era, internet companies paid millions of dollars for these generic
374
Amazingly, the intellectual property tax regime does not
names.
specifically address these valuable assets.
Another problem with the intellectual property tax regime's asset-specific
approach is that it is not equipped to tackle the increasing integration and

199, 200 (2008) ("Domain names, which are a true creation of the modern world of Internet,
made their appearance in the commercial sector in 1993.').
367. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 39, at 4.
368. See, e.g., Xuar1-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in e-Commerce: Move Over
Inherently Distinctive Trademarks-The e-Brand, i-Brand and Generic Domain Names
Ascending to Power?, SO AM. U. L. REv. 937, 965-66 (2001).
369. Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)
(commenting that domain names are often company names and names of products and services).
370. Daniel Joelson, Banks Square Off Over Internet Domain Names , BANK TEcH. NEWS
(Nov. 22, 2000), available athttp://www.americanbanker.comibtn_issues/13_11 /-137906-1 html
(reporting that "loans.com" attracts daily visitors even though it does not have an active website).
371. See generally Nguyen & Maine, supra note 39, at 48-55 (discussing how trademark law
does not protect generic domain names). See also H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire
Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reiterating the basic trademark principle that
generic terms do not receive trademark protections in ar1y circumstance). The addition of .com to
a generic term does not make the term registrable as a trademark. See In re Hotels. com, L.P., No.
76414272, 2006 WL 2850864, at *12 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (Hotels.com is generic ar1d therefore a
composite word/design mark not registrable unless entire term is disclaimed) (not precedent).
372. See generally Nguyen, supra note 368, at 965-66 (commenting on whether generic
domain names should be entitled to protection under existing law).
373. See Susan Barbieri Montgomery, The New Uniform Commercial Code: Security
Interests in Intellectual Property, SM088 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL Enuc . 373 (2007)
(asserting that "not all domain names are marks and some of the most valuable domain names
incorporate generic or descriptive terms not eligible for trademark protection, such as
<www.sex.com>'); see also Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F. 3d 137, 140
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding genericness as a dispositive question to trademark protectability); Yellow
Cab Co. of Charlottesville v. Rocha, No. CN. A. 3:00CV00013, 2000 WL 1130621, at *8 (W.D.
Va. July 5, 2000).
374. Domain Name Prices Rise Again, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Dec. 29, 2003, at A02
(reporting that domain name prices are on the rise again as evident by the purchase of''men.com"
for $1.3 million by a group of entertainment executives from Rick Schwartz); S.A. Mathieson,
It's All in the Name: Can You Still Find a Good Domain Name for Your Business?, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 30, the2003, at 19 (reporting the sale of the domain name "business. com" for
$7 .5 million and "ifcom" for $1 million).
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bundling of intellectual property in business practice. Today, many different
types of intellectual property are often bundled, as many forms of intellectual
375
property protection are available for a particular product or service.
For
376
example, Coca-Cola is protected by both trade secret and trademark laws.
Software is a classic example of the "bundling" of rights in today's
economy. For instance, Microsoft Windows is a set of complex software
3 77
programs and is covered by many copyrights.
Each time a new version of
378
the software is created, there is a potential new copyright.
Additionall.y
3 9
certain functions for Windows software programs are covered by patents.
Moreover, there is proprietafd' information and know-how in Windows
38
protected by trade secret law.
The name "Windows" is a known trademark,
identifies the products widely installed in most computers, and is used by
381
millions.
The four curving, colorful panels of the Windows logo are also
382
entitled to protection under trademark law.
Likewise, in the biotech or biopharma industry, drug companies rely on
383
and trade secrets for the protection of their research and
patents
384
development of certain drugs.
The drug companies advertise the drugs, and
375. Additionally, companies often bundle different types of intellectual property assets when
they license in or out for the daily business operation. See generally Nguyen, supra note 109, at
1309-10 (observing the bundling of trademarks and other intellectual property assets in licensing
practices); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellec tual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455 (2002) (noting the integration and simultaneous use of
patents and trademarks in business practice and calling for a new theory ofintellectual property to
address the integration of different types of intellectual property).
376. ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, LICENSING AND THE ART OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT
LAw, TACTics, FoRMs§ 6.2 (2002).
377 . See Microsoft Corp. v. Liu, No . 1:06-CV-1352-JOF, 2007 WL 4125753, at *3 (N.D. Ga.
Oct. 31, 2007) (listing the certificates of copyright registrations for some of Microsoft Window
software programs, such as: "(1) TX 4-905-936 (Office 2000 Pro); (2) TX 4-905-950 (Access
2000); (3) TX 4-905-949 (Excel 2000); (4) TX 4-906-019 (Outlook 2000); (5) TX 4-905-952
(PowerPoint 2000); (6) TX 4-905-951 (Word 2000); (7) TX 4-905-937 (Publisher 2000); (8) TX
4-309-301 (FrontPage 2000); and (9) TX 4-899-117 (PhotoDraw 2000)").
378. See generally Mark F. Radcliffe & Nels R. Nelsen, Code to Code: Per:focting Security
Interests in Copyrights: The ConfUsion Contim~es, 8 AM. BANKR. lNsT. L. REv. 8 (1997)
(analogizing a computer software program to a layer cake, each layer representing a "new version
or revision of the software ... protected by a separate copyright").
379. See Benjamin J. Kormos, Giving Frankenstein a Saul: Imposing Patentee Obligations,
21 INTELL. PRoP. J. 309, 341 (2009) (reporting that, "(a]s of 2007, Microsoft held more than
6,000 software patents").
380. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales
from a Test ofthe Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 338 (2009) (observing that
Microsoft and other software companies rely on trade secret protection afforded to software
programs distributed in binary form).
381. Microsoft brought action against others for using its well-known Windows trademark.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL 31499324, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 15, 2002).
382. See Microsoft Corp. v. Silver Star Micro, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1350-WSD, 2008 WL
115006, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2008) (listing fue various trademark registrations for Microsoft
"flag" logos in a trademark infungement case).
383. See generally Phannaceutical Patents: The Value ofPhannaceutical Patents & Strong
Intellectual
Property
Protection,
INNOVATION.ORG,
http://www.innovation.org/docurnents/File/Pharrnaceutical_Patents.pdf (last visited Oct. 24,
2010).
384. See
generally
Trade
Secrets
Litigation,
ORRICK,
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they rely on copyright, trade dress, and trademark protections for their various
advertising campaigns. Also, to market and sell their drugs, the companies
will use trademarks along with pamphlets and instruction. On a particular
drug, patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademark rights are bundled, as
the drug companies aggressively seek protection in all four intellectual
.
fior th e1r
. pro ducts. 385
property d octnnes
The bundling phenomenon raises the question: how should a particular
transaction involving integrated intellectual property be treated for tax
purposes under a tax regime that maintains distinct rules for different types of
intellectual property? An appropriate analytical framework is needed

for revising and crafting tax legislation governing intellectual
property, one that considers not only intellectual property goals but
also the integrated nature of intellectual property protections in
business.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem federal tax code does not adequately support contemporary
intellectual property policies and the realities of today's economy. It does not
ideally support the innovation goals of the intellectual property system. And it
does not adequately recognize the evolution of intellectual property, the
emergence of new intellectual property forms, or modem intellectual property
practices and trends, such as the integration and bundling of different types of
intellectual property in business today. A study of the historical development
of the intellectual property tax regime reveals causes for the current dissonance
between the tax code and intellectual property. As this Article establishes, the
vast majority of the specific tax rules governing intellectual property were
designed to enhance tax efficiency by resolving procedural dissonance that
occurred when traditional principles of taxation were used to resolve early tax
disputes. But the absence of an appropriate legal framework for intellectual
property tax legislation-one that considers optimal harmonization with the
intellectual property scheme-has resulted in a tax code that is fundamentally
flawed. Moving forward, an appropriate legal framework is needed for tax
rules; one that recognizes that tax law, as well as intellectual property law, is
central to innovation.

http://www .orrick.com/practices/intellectual__property/tradesecrets.asp (last visited Oct. 24,
2010).
385. See,
e.g,
Medication
Guide,
NucYNTA
(2009),
http://www nucynta.com/sites/all/themes/nucyntalpdf7nucynta-medication-guide.pdf

